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LOOKING BEYOND THE SUNSET: 
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON 
THE TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE 
ACT OF 20021 AND THE ISSUE OF ITS 
RENEWAL 
“The willingness to take risk is essential 
to the growth of a free market economy.” 2 
– Alan Greenspan3 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
he terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 caused severe 
loss of life and property,4 but the economic and legal rami-
fications of that day continue to plague the United States 
(“U.S.”).  The U.S. legislation H.3210,5 known as the Terrorism 
Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (“TRIA”), serves as a perfect exam-
  
 1. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, 116 Stat. 
2322 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 248, 1610, 6701 (West Supp. 2003)).  See also 
President Signs Terrorism Insurance Act, The White House website, Nov. 26, 
2002, (providing an overview of the Act’s finalization), at http://www.white-
house.gov/news/releases/2002/11/print/200211261.html (last visited Jan. 15, 
2004). 
 2. PETER BERSTEIN, AGAINST THE GODS: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF RISK 
328 (1996) (quoting Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal Reserve 
Board), quoted in Todd V. McMillan, Securitization and the Catastrophe Bond: 
A Transactional Integration of Industries Through a Capacity-Enhancing 
Product of Risk Management, 8 CONN. INS. L.J. 131, 132 (2001/2002).     
 3. Alan Greenspan serves as the chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve 
Board.  When this man speaks, the nation listens, as he is arguably one of the 
most knowledgeable individuals in the world of economics and international 
finance.  For more information on Alan Greenspan, see the Federal Reserve 
Board’s Biography website at www.federalreserve.gov/bios/greenspan.htm 
(last updated Oct. 3, 2003).  See also Greenspan Warns of “Unexpected Events” 
as Risk to Markets, AFP, Jan. 13, 2004, at http://www.business.com/search/ 
rslt_default.asp?r4=t&query=balanced+care+&type=news (last visited Feb. 2, 
2004). 
 4. See September 11: Chronology of Terror, CNN.COM, Sept. 12, 2001, (re-
porting the time-line for the occurrences of September 11), at http://www/cnn. 
com/2001/US/09/11/chronology.attack/index.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2003).   
 5. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, 116 Stat. 
2322 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 248, 1610, 6701 (West Supp. 2003)). 
T
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ple of such late blooming economic consequences requiring close 
legal scrutiny.  As of November 15, 2002, this Act requires all 
U.S. property insurers to cover terrorist risk in order to protect 
the nation from a hesitant insurance industry, which proved 
unwilling to bear the future risk of terrorism in light of the 
costs of September 11, 2001.6  TRIA presently offers U.S. insur-
ers the financial security necessary for providing terrorism in-
surance, the only limitation being that the legislation also 
comes with an expiration date.7  On December 31, 2005,8 the 
U.S. government must again decide what is necessary for the 
nation: continued TRIA-provided terrorism reinsurance or de-
regulation.9   
As the U.S. government intends for TRIA to serve as a tem-
porary insurance support mechanism,10 the legislation also 
mandates that the U.S. Treasury Department measure the pro-
gram’s success through reports that indicate the program’s vi-
  
 6. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 7. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, § 108(a), 
116 Stat. 2322, 2336. 
 8. Id.  However, the Secretary of Treasury still retains the authority to 
continue the government insurance’s program for the purposes of taking the 
actions “necessary to ensure payment, recoupment, reimbursement, or ad-
justment of compensation for insured losses arising out of any act of terrorism 
occurring during the period in which the Program was in effect….”  Id. § 
108(b).   
 9. The Secretary of Treasury will need to report TRIA’s progress to Con-
gress by June 30, 2005.  Id. § 108(d)(2).  See Jeffrey S. Bragg, Terrorism Risk 
Insurance Program, U.S. Treasury Department, at 7 (noting that the U.S. 
government plans to evaluate TRIA’s success as a program), at http://www.tr 
eas.gov/offices/domestic-finance/financial-institution/terrorism-insurance/pres 
s/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2004); Tara Bradshaw, Fact Sheet on Surveys of Terror-
ism Risk Insurance Markets, Dept. of Treasury Office of Public Affairs, Oct. 
23, 2003, at http://www.treas.gov/offices/domestic-finance/financial-instituti 
on/terrorism-insurance/press/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2004).  See also Steven 
Brostoff, Industry Uncertain About TRIA Strategy, NAT. UNDERWRITER, Jan. 
29, 2004, available at 2003 WL 69822569 (reporting that the  insurance in-
dustry is unsure as to whether to seek changes in TRIA or simply to push for 
the legislation’s renewal despite its weaknesses).  
 10. The legislation’s main purpose, as indicated by the statute itself, is “to 
establish a temporary Federal program that provides for a transparent system 
of shared public and private compensation for insured losses resulting from 
acts of terrorism….”  Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–
297, § 101(b), 116 Stat. 2322, 2323 (emphasis added). 
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ability and progress.11  The U.S. government’s Terrorism Risk 
Insurance Program (“TRIP”) has already invested in the assis-
tance of the Westat corporation,12 which will provide the federal 
government with surveys and economic perspectives for the 
government’s insurance program.13  Since the U.S. insurance 
and reinsurance industries continue to shy away from fully cov-
ering terrorism in their policies,14 the situation’s gravity re-
  
 11. Id. § 108(d)(1–2).  See also Mario L. Ugoletti, Implementing the Terror-
ism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, 5–6  (June 12, 2003) (presentation before the 
Terrorism Risk Assessment and Insurance Coverage Forum, Westin Grand, 
Washington D.C.), at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases (last visited Jan. 15, 
2003).    
 12. Westat, Corp. is a statistical survey research organization that has also 
contracted with Marsh, Inc. in order to create questionnaires and contact ref-
erence lists.  Mark Warshawsky, Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Sept. 
15, 2003, at 9 (Presentation of the U.S. Treasury Acting Assistant Secretary 
for Economic Policy at the Underwriting Conference, Orlando, FL), at 
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/po1050.htm (last visited Jan 15, 2004).  
More information on Westat, Corp. is available at http://www.westat.com/ 
(last visited Feb. 12, 2004).  For more information on March, Inc., visit the 
corporation’s website at http://www.marshweb.com/MarshPortal/PortalMain 
(last visited Feb. 13, 2004). 
 13. The U.S. Treasury Department held a meeting on January 30, 2003 
with insurance representatives in order to discuss the drafting of survey ques-
tionnaires and to select contractor bids for the undertaking.  Id. 
 14. Insurers’ hesitations particularly rest on the issue of potential bank-
ruptcy upon another terrorist attack.  Dwight Jaffe & Thomas Russell, Ex-
treme Events and the Market for Terrorism Insurance 4 (Feb. 1, 2002) (U.C. 
Berkley paper presented at the Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research Conf. on Ins., 
Cambridge, MA) (examining the reaction of markets after the occurrence of 
low “frequency/high cost” events”), available at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.ed 
u/jaffee/papers/Jrinsfeb02.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2003).  “[T]he probability 
that an insurance firm would be made bankrupt by a particularly bad terror-
ist loss during one year is substantially higher than the probability that the 
same firm would be made bankrupt by a particularly bad run of, say, auto 
insurance losses during a year.”  Id.  The insurance industry remains uncom-
fortable with bearing the entire risk of insuring against terrorism arguably 
because of the absence of historical data on the matter.  See Christian Gollier, 
Insurability 24 (Feb. 1, 2002) (paper prepared for the Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research Conf. on Ins., Cambridge, MA), available at http://www.nber.org 
/~confer/2002/insw02/insurprg.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2002).  For example, 
no one knows the likelihood of a “large terrorist attack next year.”  Id.  Inter-
estingly enough, however, this ambiguity does not paint the entire picture, as 
insurance theorists claim ambiguity alone is not determinative.  Id.  Gollier 
explains that the insurance industry’s aversion to cover terrorist-related harm 
exemplifies the “weight of evidence dilemma.”  Id. at 24–25.  He provides 
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quires that the U.S. government quickly determine TRIA’s des-
tiny, even if it means renewing the legislation again on a short-
term basis.15  The legislation’s passage strongly rested on its 
temporary nature;16 yet with the continuing terrorist threat, the 
legislation may require either a strong alternative or some seri-
ous alterations.17  U.S. officials will need to carefully examine 
the program’s statistical data as well as other insurance and 
national safety considerations before selecting a national terror-
ism insurance coverage option.   
This Note will serve to clarify the legal and economic con-
cerns that surround the forthcoming issue of TRIA’s renewal 
through a comparison of the U.S. government’s terrorism insur-
ance program with the parallel programs available in the 
United Kingdom (“U.K.”) and Israel.  An international perspec-
tive brings to light both TRIA’s limitations and achievements.  
As this Note will reveal, TRIA still has much room for im-
provement.  These issues can also potentially pose a significant 
  
Keynes-Ellsberg’s “two color problem” in order to illustrate this evidentiary 
issue: 
[T]here are two urns each containing red and black balls.  Urn 1 con-
tains 50 red balls and 50 black balls, whereas urn 2 contains 100 red 
balls and black balls in unknown proportion.  A ball is drawn at ran-
dom from an urn and receives 100 euros or nothing depending on the 
color of the ball.  The fact that people are indifferent to bet on red or 
black is used to indicate that their subjective probability for each 
color is 0.5, as in urn 1.  [One seeking to maximize their probabilities] 
should thus be indifferent to using urn 1 or urn 2 for gambling.  How-
ever, most people prefer to gamble with the unambiguous urn 1, 
where the “weight of evidence” is larger. 
Id. at 25.  The insurability problem arises when insurers are “systematically 
more adverse than consumers.”  Id.  But see John Hillman, Terrorism Insurer: 
Americans Forget the Lessons of Sep. 11, BESTWIRE, Dec. 10, 2003, available at 
LEXIS, Nexis News & Bus. Library (reporting that the vice president of ACE 
USA’s terrorism underwriting department claims that in the event that the 
U.S. government does not renew TRIA, ACE will still be able to offer clients 
“other type[s] of protection.”).      
 15. Insurers are also confronting the dilemma of TRIA’s upcoming expira-
tion.  See Lee Ann Gjertsen, P/C Outlook: Higher Rates, Consolidation, AM. 
BANKER, Dec. 30, 2003, at 1. 
 16. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, § 101(b), 
116 Stat. 2322, 2323 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. 248, 1610, 6701 (West Supp. 
2003)). 
 17. See Michele Heller & Rob Blackwell, Treasury: No Terror-Risk Exten-
sion, AM. BANKER, Dec. 16, 2003, at 4.   
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cost burden for taxpayers, making room for some improvement 
necessary.  For this reason, this Note argues in favor of TRIA’s 
renewal, but contingent on serious alterations that would make 
the legislation more meaningful and helpful to the nation.18   
After this introduction, Part II provides background informa-
tion necessary for understanding the reasoning behind the un-
availability of insurance and reinsurance within the U.S. after-
September 11, 2001 and also discusses TRIA’s legislative de-
tails.  Part III introduces the analogous insurance dilemma 
faced by the U.K. in England and in Northern Ireland from 
1992 until today, explaining the nation’s most recent legal de-
velopments as well as the implications of government insurance 
assistance for the nation’s insurance industry.  Part III also in-
troduces Israeli legal intervention in terrorism insurance cover-
age, demonstrating widespread public insurance techniques 
used for involving the private sector in mandatory national ter-
rorism coverage.  Part IV then presents a critical analysis of 
TRIA and compares the U.S. government insurance program 
with the Note’s proffered international models.19  This compari-
son then provides a global backdrop for the legislation, allowing 
for a critical comparative analysis and policy direction in sup-
  
 18. See generally Warshawsky, supra note 12.  
 19. Please note that in the case of the U.K.’s relations with Northern Ire-
land and Israel’s with respect to Palestine, the right to self-determination 
under international law also applies.  This Note, however, focuses on the eco-
nomic aspect of national terrorism insurance programs, as perceived by each 
implementing State.  For more information on this issue in relation to the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict, see John Quigley, Displaced Palestinians and a 
Right of Return, 39 HARV. INT’L L.J. 171 (1998) (focusing on the Palestinian 
right of return as addressed in the Israel/Palestine Liberation Organization 
negotiations); Richard Wilner, Nationalist Movements and the Middle East 
Peace Process: Exercises in Self-Determination, 1 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 
297 (1995) (noting that Palestinians and Israelis have a “common but conflict-
ing” right to self-determination).  For an analysis of recent developments in 
the U.K. with respect to the right to self-determination in Northern Ireland, 
see Colleen J. O’Loughlin, A Peace Process Perspective Northern Ireland and 
the Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations Belfast, April 10, 1998, 
13 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 91 (2000).  See also Geoff Gilbert, Autonomy and Minor-
ity Groups: A Right in International Law?, 35 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 307 (2002).  
See, e.g., David Wastell & Valerie Elliot, Focus the Relentless Campaign: The 
IRA is the Government Really Going to Change the Rules of Engagement?, 
SUNDAY TELEGRAPH LONDON, Dec. 20, 1992, available at 1992 WL 9566473 
(exemplifying that many consider the IRA’s plights as examples of Irish na-
tionalism). 
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port of TRIA’s renewal.  Part V concludes with a summary of 
the alterations necessary for TRIA’s maximum effectiveness as 
a facilitator of terrorism insurance coverage.   
II. TRIA’S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
A. The American Insurance Dilemma — Changes After  
September 11th 
As a result of the insurance industry’s realization of its im-
mense underestimations of underwriting terrorism due to Sep-
tember 11, 2001,20 insurance contracts renegotiations quickly 
crumbled thereafter.21  In fact, although unknown to many, 
January 1, 2002 was a monumental day in the history of Ameri-
can insurance coverage.  That day set the stage for TRIA’s pas-
sage, marking the date when most reinsurance and insurance 
companies refused to renegotiate practically all insurance con-
tracts, including terrorism coverage.22   
The reinsurance industry’s extensive refusal was devastating 
to insurance companies, since reinsurance serves as the prime 
insurance of insurers.23  Contractual agreements, also known as 
“treaties,”24 between reinsurers and insurers play a monumental 
  
 20. See Gordon Woo, Quantifying Insurance Terrorism Risk 1 (Feb. 1, 
2002) (paper prepared for the Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research Conf. on Ins., 
Cambridge, MA) available at http://www.nber.org/~confer/2002/insw02/in 
surprg.html (last visited Oct, 17, 2002).  See also Gollier, supra note 14, at 26.  
The occurrence of an “underestimated” risk effectively penalizes underwriters 
as such losses pose a direct threat to their company’s loss ratios.  Id.  For this 
reason, in such adverse situations, underwriters prefer to “overestimate” their 
risks instead.  Id.        
 21. See infra Part II.   
 22. See Jane Kendall, Comment, The Incalculable Risk: How the World 
Trade Center Disaster Accelerated the Evolution of Insurance Terrorism Exclu-
sions, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 569, 583 (2002).  Insurance terminology refers to 
insurance companies that offer reinsurance as “reinsurers,” while insurance 
companies that seek the cover of reinsurance benefit are known as the “rein-
sured” or “ceding” companies.  John S. Butler, Legal Nature and Types of Re-
insurance, in LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL REINSURANCE COLLECTIONS 
AND INSOLVENCY 10 (David M. Spector & John Milligan eds., 1988). 
 23. See 44A AM. JUR. 2d Insurance § 1809 (2003) (Reinsurance — Defini-
tions and Characteristics).  
 24. Reinsurance treaties usually apply to a large number of insurance poli-
cies that reinsurance companies underwrite for long terms on a “continual 
basis” with annual or quarterly cancellation provisions, allowing for insurance 
companies to include additional policies as long their portfolios meet original 
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role in the viability of the insurance industry.25  Through the 
dispersion of market-liability,26 reinsurers provide insurers with 
financial protection.27  Reinsurance agreements allow insurance 
companies to provide policyholder protection by transferring, or 
ceding, a part of the insured risk to a reinsurance company.28   
At a later time, reinsurance companies can then choose to reas-
sign their own risk to other investors by “retrocession.”29  For 
this reason, the reinsurance industry prevents the insolvency of 
insurers by assisting in the apportionment of liability for a par-
ticular event.30   
  
agreement conditions and standards.  ROSS PHIFER, REINSURANCE 
FUNDAMENTALS: TREATY AND FACULTATIVE 12, 46 (1996).  
 25. See id. at 6–15; Michael A. Knoerzer, Reinsurance, 690 PLI/LIT 719, 
723 (2003) (offering general information on the reinsurance market’s role in 
insurance).   
 26. Insurers find that instead of multiple insurers covering one asset the 
most cost effect way to insure large risks, such as bridges and large buildings, 
is through one insurer who then can cede their risk to a reinsurer.   Knoerzer, 
supra note 25, at 743. 
 27. See id. at 743.  
 28. No privity exists between the reinsurer and the reinsured, as the ceded 
portion creates a relationship that only relates to the ceding insurer and rein-
surer.  Id. at 721; 44A AM JUR. 2d Insurance §1812 (Reinsurance — Nature of 
Reinsurer’s Relationship to Original Policy Holder).  
 29. See John S. Diaconis, Introductory Comments and Basic Overview in a 
Changing Global Environment, 778 PLI/COMM 7, 12 (1998) (explaining fun-
damental reinsurance terminology).  See also Kendall, supra note 22, at 579.  
See generally ROBERT RIEGEL ET AL., INSURANCE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES: 
PROPERTY AND LIABILITY (6th ed. 1976).    
 30. The following example elaborates on how reinsurance provides insur-
ance coverage for assumed risks:    
Building B has a value of [$]10 million.  It is insured by insurance 
companies X and Y, with each insuring fifty percent of the total value 
of the building.  X and Y reinsure their risks with reinsurers R sub 
[to R sub n], respectively, through reinsurance contracts while retain-
ing forty percent of their respective risks for their own accounts.  If 
the building is destroyed, the [$]10 million loss will no longer be 
borne entirely by X and Y.  X and Y will have to pay for the loss up 
front but, ultimately, their net payout will be limited to [$]2 million 
each. 
William B. Bice, Comment, British Government Reinsurance and Acts of Ter-
rorism: The Problems of Pool Re, 15 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 441, 445 (1993), 
incorporating an example from: 1 KLAUS GERATHEWOHL ET AL., REINSURANCE 
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 3–6 (John Milligan–Whyte eds., 1988).  Note, how-
ever, reinsurance treaties for the most part serve as indemnity contracts, 
which means that the reinsurer does not make any payments until the ceding 
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However, the September 11 attacks pushed the U.S.’ intricate 
insurance system to its limit, and led reinsurers to withdraw 
from such expansive liability for terrorist damage exposure, as 
reinsurers were reportedly liable for 60 to 80% of insurance 
payments.31  Reinsurance companies’ new policies and renewal 
options excluded terrorism liability and, therefore, severely lim-
ited insurers’ terrorism coverage.32  This overt exclusion led 
many property owners and developers to scramble to find pricey 
alternatives before TRIA’s enactment.33  
As a result of high insurance premiums and, in many cases, 
lack of coverage offered, nearly half of U.S. businesses had no 
terrorism insurance coverage before the legislation’s enact-
ment.34  In fact, the property industry asserted that new build-
ing projects estimated at $15 billion35 were stalled due to the 
  
company pays a percentage of the reinsurer’s portion for each claim.  See 
PHIFER, supra note 24, at 230. 
 31. Jim Saxton, Economic Perspective on Terrorism Insurance 4 (May 
2002) (paper prepared for the Joint Economic Congressional Committee) 
available at http://www.house.gov/jec/terrorism/insur.pdf (last visited May 12, 
2003).  
 32. See Kendall, supra note 22, at 581–87. 
 33. See, e.g., William Sherman, Putting a Premium on Disaster: Insurance 
Costs Skyrocketing after Attacks, DAILY NEWS, April 28, 2002, at 22.  Several 
prominent insurance deals that took place after contract renewal either re-
quired much higher premiums or completly excluded terrorist harm: (1) After 
October 31, New York’s Metropolitan Transit Authority (“MTA”) faced an 
increase in insurance rates from $6 million for $1.5 billion coverage and now 
is paying $18 million for $500 million coverage, a 200% increase, and the MTA 
also needed to purchase separate coverage for terrorism coverage at a $7.5 
million premium for $70 million worth of coverage; (2) San Francisco’s Golden 
Gate bridge’s new insurance policy doubled and did not cover terrorism; (3) 
Yankee stadium’s insurance premium increased 125%, but the team stated 
that it would not increase admission; (4) The Meadowland’s insurance pre-
mium significantly increased from $700,000 to $2.1 million; and (5) Co-op and 
condominium buildings’ premiums increased 30% to 50%.  Id.  In addition, 
Times Square’s Condé Nast building was found to be in default on its mort-
gage because of the building’s lack of terrorism insurance, creating a heated 
legal dispute between the mortgaging bank and property owners.  Thomas J. 
Walsh, 4 Times Square Runs Into Terrorism Coverage Problem, May 13, 2002, 
at http://www.crnewspage.com/4_times_story.html; Michael Kercheval, A Pol-
icy on Terrorism Insurance: Who Will Pay Out if Terrorism Strike Malls?, 
CHAIN STORE AGE EXECUTIVE WITH SHOPPING CENTER AGE, May 1, 2002, at 92.  
 34. See Look, No Umbrella, ECONOMIST, Sep. 7, 2002, at Fin. & Econ. sec. 
 35. George W. Bush, President Reiterates the Need for Terrorism Insur-
ance Agreement, (Oct. 3, 2002) (transcript available at http://www.white 
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lack of terrorism insurance availability.36  As a result, insurance 
uncertainty was negatively affecting the U.S. economy.37  Had 
the U.S. government refrained from assisting in the reinstate-
ment of terrorism insurance coverage, another terrorist attack 
could have easily driven many businesses into bankruptcy, de-
stroyed existing bank loans secured by properties of which the 
underlying value would have significantly diminished, limited 
future project funding and damaged pension funds as property 
investments would fail to reap profitable reimbursements.38  
Due to these devastating prospects, TRIA presently provides 
governmental support to the insurance industry as a reinsurer 
of “last resort.”39   
The primary burden of covering the costs of the attacks was 
carried by insurance and reinsurance companies under “all 
risk”40 insurance coverage for businesses and property owners in 
  
house.gov/news/releases/2002/10/print/200210003-6.html (last visited Nov. 22, 
2002)).  But see Look, No Umbrella, supra note 34, (pointing to a total sum of 
$8 million).   
 36. See Adjustments to the NIPA’s for the Impact of the September 11th Ter-
rorist Attacks, 2001: Third Quarter, Survey of Current Business, Bureau of 
Econ. Analysis (Nov. 2001). 
 37. Id.   
 38. For this reason, secured lenders and insurance company/relationship 
lenders took various approaches in handling the issue of terrorism insurance.  
Richard R. Goldberg, Real Estate Financing Documentation: Coping with the 
New Realities, SH004 ALI-ABA 537, 549 (2003).  Securitized lenders required 
terrorism insurance coverage on new loans and also demanded similar insur-
ance on existing loans and projects.  Id. at 549.  In contrast, insurance com-
pany and relationship lenders allowed for terrorism insurance waivers, but 
some of these companies waived the procurement of terrorism insurance until 
it was commercially available to other similarly situated property owners.  Id.  
Cf. Bice, supra note 30, at 448 (noting the implication of lack of terrorism 
coverage in the case of the U.K.).   
 39. Cf. Paul Durman, Government Shares Bomb Insurance, INDEPENDENT, 
Dec. 22, 1992, at 1 (referring to the U.K.’s terrorism insurance scheme as one 
where the government serves as the “reinsurer of last resort”).  
 40. See HOLMES’ APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE 2d § 1.10.  The standard defini-
tion of “all risk” insurance coverage is as follows:   
[A]ll risk coverage should be interpreted to be just that — “All Risks.” 
Once the loss is proven by the insured to be caused by some risk gen-
erally covered…other than normal depreciation or inherent vice or 
defect, the insurer should have the burden to prove that the loss does 
not fall within some specified exclusion or exception.  That the in-
surer has the burden of proof to prove no coverage under an all risk 
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the downtown World Trade Center area.41  According to the in-
surance industry, insurance payouts for the attacks have 
marked the steepest financial burden for the U.S. insurance 
industry since Hurricane Andrew42 as well as the largest insur-
ance catastrophe ever worldwide.43  Although the primary in-
surance industry could possibly have sidestepped the costs of 
the September 11 attacks through a “war exclusion” clause 
found in most “all risk” policies, the insurance industry re-
frained from using this legal backdoor.44 
  
policy is the American rule in all the states, with the possible excep-
tion of Texas. 
Id.  See also Joseph P. Snyder & Susan A. McAllister, Risk Management; 
Keeping Abreast of Insurance Policies: Review of Available Property/Liability 
Coverages, 14 COMM. LEASING L. & S. 3 (2001).  The insurance industry pro-
vides a multitude of coverage options that are slowly eroding the past popular 
“all risk” insurance coverage.  Id.  Snyder and McAllister elaborate this point:   
Property insurance coverage…protects the owner of property and 
others who have insurable interest in the property against loss due to 
fire and other perils. There are two general types of property insur-
ance coverage: (1) “Named Perils” coverage, which clearly identifies 
the specific risks or perils insured against…, and (2) “Special Form” 
coverage, which covers all direct physical loss or damage to the in-
sured unless it is caused by a peril specifically excluded from cover-
age under the terms of the policy.  Special form coverage is by far the 
most common type of coverage purchased.  It is the successor to “All 
Risk” insurance and is more expansive than its predecessor because 
it more specifically limits the occurrences excluded from coverage.  
Though many leases still require “All Risk” coverage, it has disap-
peared from the titles of insurance companies.          
Id.  For a list of items typically excluded in U.K. “all risk” insurance contracts, 
see DIGBY C. JESS, THE INSURABILITY OF COMMERCIAL RISK: LAW AND PRACTICE, 
316–17 (Sweet & Maxwell 3rd ed. 2001).    
 41. However, the World Trade Center’s insurance coverage may have actu-
ally been higher than the national average due to the building’s previous ex-
perience from the 1993 attack.    
 42. In 1992, Hurricane Andrews reportedly created damage that cost in-
surers $15.5 billion in losses.  The Ten Most Costly Catastrophes, United 
States, 1989–1999, reported in THE FACT BOOK 2001, 93 (Insurance Informa-
tion Institute 2001).   
 43. See Jeffery W. Stempel, The Insurance Aftermath of September 11: 
Myriad Claims, Multiple lines, Arguments Over Occurrence Counting, War 
Risk Exclusions, the Future of Terrorism Coverage, and New Issues of Gov-
ernment Role, 37 TORT & INS. L.J. 817 (2002); Jeffrey E. Thomas, Exclusion of 
Terrorist Related Harms From Insurance Coverage: Do The Costs Justify the 
Means?, 36 IND. L. REV. 397, 399 (2003).  
 44. See Stempel, supra note 43, at 817. 
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War exclusion clauses specify that insurance companies 
should not have to pay for the costs of damages inflicted by an 
enemy state.45  For example, in Pan American World Airways, 
Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety,46 the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit ruled that Aetna did not have recourse to the 
war exclusion clause in the aftermath of the Pan American 
commercial airplane hijacking.47  In this case, terrorists had 
forced a plane to land in Egypt in order to use the threat of 
harm as a bargaining tool for their cause, which ultimately led 
to the plane’s destruction.  The Court reasoned that war can 
exist between “quasi-sovereign entities”48 and can also “exist 
between sovereign states,”49 but insisted that the Popular Front 
for the Liberation of Palestine’s (“PFLP”) actions were inde-
pendent from other Palestinian entities and, therefore, unre-
lated to any type of sovereign’s act of war.50  
Despite this legal precedent, insurance companies could have 
made the claim that the September 11 events were acts of war 
in light of President Bush’s declaration to that effect and subse-
quent U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan.  The insurance 
industry could have also pointed to the strong ties between the 
Taliban and Al Qaeda.51  Nevertheless, after carefully consider-
  
 45. See generally Kendall, supra note 22, at 573 (explaining the history of 
war exclusion clauses). 
 46. Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety, 505 
F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1974).  See also Holiday Inn, Inc. v. Aetna Insurance, 571 F. 
Supp. 1460, 1500 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (noting that: “It is not sufficient [for a ter-
rorist group] to achieve [state] status [when] that … group or entity in ques-
tion occupy territory within the boundary of the sovereign state upon the con-
sent of that state’s de jure government.”).  But see Wilker Bros. Co. v. Lum-
bermans Mutual Casualty Co., 529 F. Supp. 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (excluding 
loss from coverage for a mob looting of a manufacturing plant in Nicaragua 
during the nation’s civil war).  For a thorough analysis of the case law regard-
ing war exclusion clauses in insurance contracts, see John W. Stamper, Look-
ing at the Events of September 11: Some Effects and Implications, 69 DEF. 
COUNS. J. 152 (2002).       
 47. See Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety, 505 
F.2d at 1009.  See also Sunny South Aircraft Service, Inc. v. American Fire & 
Casualty Co., 140 So. 2d 78 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962), aff’d, 51 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 
1973). 
 48. Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety, 505 
F.2d at 1009. 
 49. Id. at 1013. 
 50. Id.  
 51. See Stamper, supra note 46, at 152.     
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ing the public relations and cost ramifications of such action 
and the court’s probable leniency towards insured parties,52 the 
insurance industry chose not to pursue any possible “war exclu-
sion” argument.53    
Before September 11, underwriters freely assumed the risk of 
terrorism under “all risk” insurance policies.54  At that time, in-
surers considered the chances of domestic terrorist attacks on 
the U.S. as reasonably miniscule in comparison to other insur-
ance coverage costs.55  The costs of the September 11 World 
Trade Center attacks, however, were far from miniscule.  The 
tragedy of September 11 cost insurers an estimated $100 bil-
lion.56  Although the insurance industry was able to pay for most 
of the damages, another terrorist catastrophe would, according 
to the industry, deplete their financial reserves and force many 
insurers into bankruptcy, potentially devastating the U.S. in-
surance business.57  In the case of the World Trade Center dis-
aster, the insurance industry had not anticipated such major 
losses due to terrorism and this lack of foresight forced insurers 
and reinsurers to assume a substantial portion of the damages 
of September 11.58   
  
 52. See Westchester Resco Co. v. New England Reinsurance Corp., 818 
F.2d 2 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that insurance policy ambiguities are “construed 
strictly against” the insurer).  See also Thomas, supra note 43, at 420–23 (ex-
plaining the transaction costs associated with litigating terrorism exclusion 
from insurance and reinsurance coverage).      
 53. See Stempel, supra note 43, at 817. 
 54. See Thomas, supra note 43, at 402. 
 55. See RICHARD J. HILLMAN, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 
TERRORISM INSURANCE: ALTERNATIVE PROGRAMS FOR PROTECTING INSURANCE 
CONSUMERS 1 (2001) (Testimony before the Subcommittee on Capital Markets, 
Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises, Committee on Financial 
Services House of Representatives).   
 56. Gregg J. Loubier & Jason B. Aro, Insuring the Risk of Terror: Questions 
of the Costs and Application of Terror Insurance Remains Open, 25 AUG. L.A. 
L. 18 (2002).  
 57. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (“NAIC”) noted 
that even a $25 million loss for a primary insurance property/casualty insurer 
would pose solvency issues for 886 companies, which represents 44% of com-
panies providing for such insurance.  Thomas, supra note 43, at 403.   
 58. See World Trade Center Attack — The Ramifications, Tyser Group 
Limited, (explaining and listing the monetary losses that insurance companies 
faced world wide due to the September 11 attacks), at http://www.tyseruk. 
co.uk/wtc.pdf (last visited Jan. 18, 2004).  In fact, the World Trade Center’s 
bombing also changed the lender’s insurance requirements at closing, as one 
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In order to prevent this exorbitant cost exposure, reinsurers 
redrafted their insurance treaties to exclude terrorism.  Pri-
mary insurers and reinsurers’ agreements involve a high level 
of contract negotiability, which allows for such reinsurance ex-
clusions.59  Insurers and reinsurers draft sophisticated negotia-
tion with regard to treaties as compared to the standard boiler-
plate policies that primary insurers provide to insured parties.60  
The distinction poses significant legal implications.  The inher-
ent flexibility of treaties allows each party to include or exclude 
terms through negotiation.61  Moreover, reinsurance treaties 
usually maintain provisions requiring dispute resolution 
through private arbitration, which further limits judicial inter-
vention.62  This freedom of contract limited the U.S. courts’ and 
government’s intervention in such insurance matters.63  
  
of the hotly litigated issues with respect to insurance coverage for the dam-
ages were the existence of the actual insurance policies themselves.  Goldberg, 
supra note 38, at 548.  The billion-dollar World Trade Center transaction was 
closed through the use of insurance binders placed with multiple carriers.  Id.  
The use of these insurance binders or ACORD 27 certificates meant that in-
surance policies were never issued; nevertheless, the court used these binders 
in order to construe an applicable insurance policy.  Id. 
 59. See James A. Johnson, Gentlemen’s Agreement, 81 MICH. B.J. 20, 23 
(2002) (providing background information on reinsurance practice). 
 60. See also ROBERT MERKIN ED., WHAT IS REINSURANCE? A COMPARATIVE 
STUDY 2, 51 (AIDA Reinsurance Working Party, 1998).   
 61. See id.     
 62. See LAW OF REINSURANCE § 21:1 (1993); MERKIN, supra note 60, at 51.  
However, the reinsurance markets globalization has increased the amount of 
litigation involving claim disputes.  Id. at 2.  See also Jonathan F. Bank & 
Patricia Winters, Reinsurance Arbitration: A U.S. Perspective, in LAW AND 
PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL REINSURANCE COLLECTIONS AND INSOLVENCY 554–
86  (David M. Spector & John Milligan eds., 1988) (providing a historical over-
view and analysis of U.S. reinsurance arbitration); Richard G. Waterman, 
Reinsurance Arbitration: A Process in Transition, 854 PLI/COMM 477 (2003); 
Michael C. Zeller, Procedures for the Resolution of U.S. Insurance and Rein-
surance Disputes, 854 PLI/COMM 487 (2003).  For a general introduction to 
international arbitration, see W. MICHAEL REISMAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION — CASES, MATERIALS AND NOTES ON THE RESOLUTION 
OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DISPUTES (David L. Shapiro et al. eds., 1997). 
 63. See Kendall, supra note 22, at 584 (“Whereas state regulatory agencies 
exercise veto power over the specific terms of insurance policies intended for 
issuance to consumers by direct writers, they exercise little power over the 
terms of reinsurance treaties as a matter of longstanding practice.”).  How-
ever, reinsurers still face regulation through their ceding companies, since 
state law limits the “ceding company’s ability to take credit on its statutory 
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Due to the cessation of contractual obligations after January 
1, 2002, many reinsurers were free to abstain from providing 
terrorism insurance coverage and this was the option that most 
insurers chose to take.64  The few reinsurance companies that 
did provide such insurance post January 1, 2002 nearly doubled 
their premium rates while simultaneously decreasing their to-
tal coverage.65  As a result, the insurance industry was left on a 
tightrope without the assumed safety net of reinsurance.  De-
spite this, however, the primary insurance industry needed to 
satisfy state regulation standards.66  Thus, in part, the lack of 
legal intervention forced the insurance industry to consider the 
discontinuation of terrorism related insurance.    
1. The State-Level Domino Effect of Insurance Deregulation 
As most reinsurance companies dropped terrorism coverage, 
the insurance industry struggled to provide terrorism policies 
for their clients.  The National Association of Insurance Com-
missioners (“NAIC”)67 asked for each state to allow for the In-
surance Services Office’s (“ISO”)68 exclusion modifications, 
which would exclude losses stemming from less costly acts of 
  
financial statement for the reinsurance” coverage if a reinsurer is not licensed 
to transact business in the state.  Anthony B. Sherman, United States — Gen-
eral Framework and Conduct of Business, in THE IN-HOUSE COUNSEL’S GUIDE 
TO INSURANCE AND REINSURANCE 2003, 89 (Rob Mannix et al. eds., 2003). 
 64. As reinsurers conduct business on an international scale with sophisti-
cated insurance companies, reinsurers face limited government regulation.  
See Thomas, supra note 43, at 403.  For this reason, reinsurers were easily 
able to subtract terrorism insurance coverage from their treaty negotiations 
with insurers.  See id.   
 65. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 66. See infra Part II.A.1.  
 67. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (“NAIC”) serves 
as an insurance regulation organization, representing all fifty states, the Dis-
trict of Columbia and the four U.S. territories.  The NAIC provides a forum for 
uniform insurance policy development and assists state regulators in protect-
ing the interests of insurance consumers for the provision of common financial 
objectives and conduct regulation.  For more information, see the NAIC’s web-
site at http://www.naic.org/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2003).  
 68. For more information on the Insurance Services Office’s (“ISO”) most 
current stance on terrorism insurance, see the ISO’s website at http://www.is 
o.com/filings/response.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2004).  The ISO’s website also 
provides forms and policy writing rules in response to TRIA’s requirements.           
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terrorism.69  The ISO supplies hundreds of U.S. insurance com-
panies with advice and standard forms of insurance policy pro-
visions,70 and established licensed forms for terrorism exclu-
sions.71  The ISO’s exclusionary clauses limited insurance com-
panies’ exposure to a maximum of $25 million72 within a sev-
enty-two hour time frame, or for the death of fifty or more peo-
ple; furthermore, the threshold amount did not include terrorist 
activity using nuclear, chemical or biological weapons.73  Thus, 
terrorism coverage excluded properties and development pro-
jects requiring coverage greater than proscribed, especially tro-
phy buildings and national landmarks.74    
While most states allowed for insurance deregulation, several 
prominent states such as New York, California, Texas, Georgia 
and Florida withheld approval.75  New York and California ar-
dently opposed the ISO’s exclusionary clause.76  California re-
  
 69. See S. Roy Woodall, Jr., Terrorism Insurance — The 2002 Market Place, 
CRS REPORT RS21106, at 3–4,  available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/sec 
urity/library/report/crs/RS21075.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2004). 
 70. For more information, see the ISO’s website at http://www.iso.com (last 
visited Jan. 5, 2004). 
 71. Terrorism, as defined by the ISO, consisted of:  
Activities against persons, organizations or property of any nature: 
(1) That involve the following or preparation of the following: (a) Use 
or threat of force or violence; or (b) Commission or threat of a danger-
ous act; or (c) Commission or threat of an act that interferes with or 
disrupts an electronic, communication, information, or mechanical 
system; and (2) When one or both of the following applies: (a) The ef-
fect is to intimidate or coerce a government or the civilian population 
or any segment thereof, or to disrupt any segment of the economy; or 
(b) It appears that the intent is to intimidate of coerce a government, 
or to further a political, ideological, religious, social or economic ob-
jectives or to express (or express opposition to) a philosophy or ideol-
ogy.   
ISO Properties, Inc., Exclusion of Terrorism (with Limited Exception) and 
Exclusion of War and Military Action, (2001), at 1–2. 
 72. The adoption of the $25 million limit stemmed from insurers’ concerns 
that any higher amount would create a severe threat to the solvency of a sub-
stantial percentage of insurers of property and casualty insurance.  See Tho-
mas, supra note 43, at 404.   
 73. States Adopt Terror Exclusion Clauses in Absence of Any Federal Solu-
tion, INS. DAY, Mar. 5, 2002, at law sec. [hereinafter States Adopt Terror Ex-
clusion Clauses].  
 74. See Look, No Umbrella, supra note 34. 
 75. Loubier & Aro, supra note 56, at 19.  
 76. MERKIN, supra note 60.   
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fused to accept the ISO’s terrorism exclusion since the state’s 
regulators found: the ISO’s definition of terrorism to be too 
broad; the $25 million threshold of national damage overwhelm-
ingly low; and the seventy-two hour time period as plainly arbi-
trary.77  New York state regulators voiced similar grievances 
with the ISO’s exclusion clause, and further noted that the $25 
million threshold would exclude practically every building in 
downtown Manhattan, especially buildings near the World 
Trade Center site.78        
Since insurance regulation primarily falls under state law,79 
insurers who wished to follow the exception clause started writ-
ing property insurance policies through affiliated companies 
conducting business within insurance-friendly states.80  Despite 
a limited amount of insurers,81 who established their own terror-
ism insurance coverage in separate policies, terrorism insur-
ance remained extremely expensive and scarce.82  Meanwhile, 
the insurance industry also significantly increased commercial 
property insurance premiums in order to assist covering Sep-
tember 11 costs.83  As the insurance industry limited its in-
  
 77. States Adopt Terror Exclusion Clauses, supra note 73.  
 78. Id.  
 79. McCarran–Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (2000).  For an over-
view of insurance rate regulation, see SCOTT E. HARRINGTON, INSURANCE 
DEREGULATION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (Washington, D.C. 2000).        
 80. Loubier & Aro, supra note 56, at 19. 
 81. According to one source, five carriers offered terrorism insurance cov-
erage with limits of $200 million, charging premiums that “far outweighed the 
costs of regular casualty insurance.”  Richard R. Goldberg, Real Estate Fi-
nancing Documentation: Coping with New Realities, SH004 ALI–ABA 537, 
548 (2003).  The list of such insurers was extremely limited, and included the 
following insurers: Lloyd’s, AIG and ACE.  See Look, No Umbrella, supra note 
34. 
 82. Look, No Umbrella, supra note 34.   
 83. Bob Howard, Commercial Real Estate; Tenants to Pay Increased Rents 
in 2002.  See also Insurance: Fees for Commercial Property Will Jump, as 
Landlords Face Premiums Hikes of 30% to 100%, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Dec. 25, 
2001, at 5 (This article indicates that the insurance industry hiked up premi-
ums also due to years of under-pricing and a general decline in the equity 
market, which stemmed from insurance companies’ previous practice of in-
vesting premiums into the stock market for a profit that would in turn mini-
mize premiums.).  
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volvement in insurance claims arising from terrorist acts, the 
nation turned to the U.S. government for a solution.84           
B. U.S. Congressional Action: A Myriad of Changes Before 
TRIA’s Enactment 
Due to the lack of insurance for properties and major building 
projects, the U.S. government moved to support the insurance 
industry in Congress’ first and second sessions.  After countless 
deliberations, the legislature enacted the “Terrorism Risk In-
surance Act of 2002,”85 which many now refer to as TRIA.  The 
main difficulty in passing the bill was merging the House of 
Representatives’ plan, H.R. 321086 (the Terrorism Risk Protec-
tion Act), with the Senate’s plan, S. 260087 (the Terrorism Risk 
Insurance Act of 2002), in order to establish TRIA.  Both plans 
entailed the federal government’s monetary support only after 
the insurance industry’s costs of terrorist-instigated damages 
exceeded an established monetary threshold; however, each 
house differed in terms of deductible amounts, government as-
sumption of risk, limits on punitive damages and repayment 
arrangements.88  The final version of the bill incorporated bits 
and pieces of both houses’ legislative plans.  For this reason, an 
understanding of the final product requires some attention to 
the deliberation proceedings, since the Act provides no explana-
tions or legislative history.  
The House’s “Terrorism Risk Protection Act” structured a re-
insurance scheme that would provide insurers a way to spread 
their losses after a catastrophic terrorist attack in a manner 
very different from the enacted legislation.89  Under the House’s 
plan, the federal government would assume 90% of the insur-
  
 84. See Adjustments to the NIPA’s for the Impact of the September 11th Ter-
rorist Attacks, 2001: Third Quarter, Survey of Current Business, Bureau of 
Econ. Analysis, (Nov. 2001); Claire Wilkinson, United States — Uninsured 
Terror Risks Set to Rise, Congress Warned, LLOYD’S LIST, Mar. 1, 2002, at 6.   
 85. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, 116 Stat. 
2322 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 248, 1610, 6701 (West Supp. 2003)).   
 86. Terrorism Risk Protection Act, H.R. 3210, 107th Cong., 1st  Sess., 
(2001).  
 87. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, S. 2600, 107th Cong., 2d Sess., 
(2002). 
 88. CBO STUDY, Federal Reinsurance for Disasters, Sept. 2002, at 25–26, 
available at http://www.cbo.gov (last visited May 13, 2003). 
 89. See H.R. 3210 § 2. 
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ance industry’s losses when such losses amounted to over $1 
billion within a year of the terrorist activity.90  The House’s plan 
also provided assistance for smaller insurance claims, if such 
claims threatened the solvency of a participating smaller in-
surer.91  For example, the government could intervene even 
when an insurance claim for losses caused by terrorism ex-
ceeded 10% of an effected insurance company’s surplus capital 
and net premiums.92  Therefore, a claim as relatively small as 
$100 million, under the House’s plan, may have merited gov-
ernment support.93   
Despite the House’s seeming cornucopia of reinsurance cover-
age, insurance companies would eventually have to repay the 
government for a large part of the financial assistance re-
ceived.94  For losses under $20 million, insurers would have been 
liable to the government for three-quarters of the total amount 
the government paid.95  Within the first year, insurers would 
have been responsible for one-quarter of the repayment due.96  
Under the House’s plan, insurers would have to reimburse the 
government’s financial assistance after an unstated number of 
years at a rate set at insurers’ annual assessments, not exceed-
ing 3% of their premiums.97  For claims over $20 million and 
under the budgetary cut off of $100 billion, policyholders’ pre-
miums would have faced governmental surcharges of up to 3% 
of their premiums,98 but the government would not have re-
quired insurers to pay interest.99   
Alternately, the Senate’s reinsurance plan offered terrorism 
insurance coverage without requiring insurance companies to 
  
 90. Elaine S. Povich, House OKs Insurance Bill; Measure Would Allow 
Coverage Against Terrorist Acts, NEWSDAY (NY), Nov. 30, 2001, at A65 (noting 
that the White House endorsed the House’s plan, but prefers the Senate’s 
legislation). 
 91. CBO STUDY, supra note 88, at 25. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. See H.R. 3210 § 5–7. 
 95. Id.  
 96. Id.  
 97. CBO STUDY, supra note 88, at 25.   
 98. Id.  See Paul Teller, H.R. — Terrorism Risk Protection Act (Oxley), 
Republican Study Committee Legislative Bulletin, available at http://www. 
house.gov/bulletin/RSC/ (last updated Nov. 29, 2001).   
 99. H.R. 3210 § 8(c).  
File: IreneMacro.doc Created on: 2/14/2004 4:41 PM Last Printed: 3/29/2004 3:15 PM 
2004] TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE ACT OF 2002 845 
reimburse the government, similar to the law’s final version.  
After a series of unsuccessful House bills,100 the Senate enacted 
its own version of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act.101  The 
Senate’s reinsurance initiative provided insurance funding 
without repayment, but only after the insurance industry first 
paid a certain deductible.102  Under the Senate’s plan, if a catas-
trophic event were to occur within the first year103 of the pro-
gram’s implementation, the insurance industry would have 
been liable for the initial $10 billion in losses.104   
After the insurance industry had paid the $10 billion, the 
government would pay for 80% of all losses up to the maximum 
of $100 billion.105  Similar to the House’s strategy, the Senate’s 
bill allowed for government assistance for losses under $10 bil-
lion only when the solvency of an individual insurance firm was 
at stake.106  The deductible would have been the insurer’s mar-
ket share percentage multiplied by the government’s $10 billion 
requirement.107  In this way, the Senate hoped to allow the fed-
eral government to assume terrorism risk funding only after the 
insurance industry had already assumed their initial responsi-
bility to make payments after the occurrence of a terrorist act.             
Regardless of the drastic differences between the House and 
Senate’s legislation, Congressional debates mainly involved dis-
  
 100. The following bills were unsuccessful in the first session of the Senate’s 
107th Congress: S. 1743, S.1744, S. 1748, and S. 1751.  
 101. See S. 2600. 
 102. See id. §§ 3(7) & 4(e). 
 103. If the treasury decided to extend the program for more than one year, 
then insurers would be responsible to pay a deductible of $15 billion in initial 
losses.      
 104. See S. 2600 § 4(e)(II).  
 105. See id. § 4(e)(I)(A).  
 106. See id. § 3(7)(A–B). 
 107. According to the Senate’s Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, an 
insurer’s market share would have been: 
[C]alculated using the total amount of direct written property and 
casualty insurance premiums for the participating insurance com-
pany during the 2-year period preceding the year in which the subject 
act of terrorism (or during such other period for which adequate data 
are available, as determined by the Secretary [of the Treasury]), as a 
percentage of the aggregate of all such property an casualty insur-
ance premiums industry-wide during that period. 
Id. § 3(4)(A).       
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agreement on tort reform.108  Although both Houses agreed that 
terrorism insurance assistance would require state preemp-
tion,109 and that the Secretary of the Treasury should be ap-
pointed as final adjudicator of insurance claims,110 the House’s 
bill also added prohibitions against claims seeking punitive 
damages, limited cases to federal courts, and sought to cap at-
torneys’ fees at 20% of awarded damages with penalties for dis-
obedience.111  However, the Senate refused to pass legislation 
minimizing the legal rights of litigants and their attorneys,112 
leading to a bipartisan debate that lasted the entire second ses-
sion of Congress, and that went unresolved, ultimately leaving 
these sections out of the bill.113  Interestingly enough, the issue 
of whether the U.S. government should assist in terrorism in-
surance coverage rested heavily upon attorneys’ fees.             
C. The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (“TRIA”)  
TRIA ended all debates with important concessions made by 
both Houses.  The legislation now offers a version of insurance 
financial backing similar to the Senate’s bill, for a temporary 
three-year span.114  TRIA specifically mandates that all property 
insurance companies must cover terrorism risk coverage,115 ex-
  
 108. See Loubier & Aro, supra note 56, at 21.      
 109. H.R. 3210 § 12; S. 2600 § 10.  
 110. H.R. 3210 § 3; S. 2600 § 4(a)(2).  
 111. H.R. 3210 § 15(a)(7) (included in the Nov. 29, 2001 and Dec. 3, 2001 
versions of the bill).   
 112. In fact, many senators opposed the passage of such legislation, since 
many felt that the government’s contemplated reinsurance scheme and litiga-
tion reform would in effect act as a “sop to corporate America.”  Povich, supra 
note 90.  
 113. See id; CBO STUDY, supra note 88, at 25 (noting that the House and 
Senate differed on the matter of punitive damages).   
 114. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, §§ 108(a), 
102 (11)(D).   
 115. TRIA requires that all insurance companies that fall under the Act’s 
provision must participate.  See id. §§ 102(6), 103(a)(3).  TRIA defines “in-
surer” to include: (1) any insurance entity licensed to conduct business in any 
state in the U.S.; (2) all eligible insurers under the NAIC’s listing of Alien 
Insurers; (3) federally approved insurers providing coverage for maritime, 
energy or aviation activity; (4) state residual market insurance entities or 
state workers’ compensation funds; and (5) any other entity that fall under 
section 103(f) of TRIA, which requires that an entity wishing inclusion in 
TRIA must apply before the occurrence of a terrorist act.  Id.        
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cluding reinsurance,116 making all terrorism exclusions previ-
ously approved by various state commissions now void.117     
Legislative constraints have also created many compromises 
between the two extremes taken by the House and the Senate.  
TRIA permits suits for punitive damages, but excludes the gov-
ernment from suit, thus freeing the nation from potential liabil-
ity.118  There is no language referring to attorneys’ fees and non-
economic damages;119 however, the law limits suits for damages 
arising from terrorist attacks to a Congressionally designated 
federal court.120  This jurisdictional distinction might very well 
produce smaller awards in damages than pro-litigant state 
courts.121  However, the merging of pending legislation regarding 
  
 116. Id. § 108(a–b). 
 117. Id. §§ 102(6)(A–C), 105(a–c).  Lorelie S. Masters et al., Overview of the 
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, 686 PLI/LIT 427 (2003).  TRIA does not obligate 
reinsurers to provide insurance for terrorism related harm, as the U.S. gov-
ernment under the Act takes on this role.  See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act 
of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, §§ 102(6)(A–C), 105(a–c).  Section 105 simply 
states that: “Any terrorism exclusion in a contract for property and casualty 
insurance that is in force on the date of enactment of this Act shall be void to 
the extent that it excludes losses that otherwise be insured losses.”  Id. § 
105(a–c) (emphasis added).  However, the amount of coverage that TRIA pro-
vides for the general public is questionable, as TRIA requires the availability 
of terrorism insurance coverage; it does not specify how much it should cost.  
See Thomas, supra note 43, at 404.  Accordingly, terrorism insurance coverage 
remains expensive for most businesses, which means that insurers are not 
insuring terrorism in all of their property and casualty policies.  Id.  Further-
more, the U.S. Treasury Department explains in an interim guideline that 
TRIA requires that insurers make terrorism insurance “available,” but the Act 
does not require that insurers cover all risks that relate to terrorism damage, 
such as nuclear, biological and chemical damages.  Masters, supra note 117, 
at 430–31.  Furthermore, TRIA also has a provision that allows insurers to 
add their previous terrorism exclusions in their contracts after providing their 
insured notices of such or if the policy holder does not pay for the additional 
terrorism coverage.  Id.  See also Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. 
L. No. 107–297, § 105(c).  For additional analysis of the ramifications of these 
provisions, see infra Part IV.     
 118. See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, § 
107(a)(5). 
 119. See id. § 107. 
 120. Id. § 107(a)(4). 
 121. See generally RICHARD L. MARCUS ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: A MODERN 
APPROACH (West Group 3d ed. 2000).  This jurisdictional limitation may also 
make it difficult for foreign individuals and companies to prosecute claims 
outside of the U.S.  Aon Reed Stenhouse Corp., The U.S. Federal Terrorism 
Risk Insurance Act of 2002 Implications for Canadian Insureds, AON STATUS 
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frozen terrorist assets ameliorates TRIA’s escape-valve with 
respect to punitive damages,122 although it remains questionable 
whether or not such a provision will have force.123                      
The government’s terrorism insurance assistance scheme al-
lows the Secretary of the Treasury to determine and provide 
insurance-loss coverage, up to $100 billion for commercial prop-
erty and casualty insurers’ liabilities resulting from future ter-
rorist attacks,124 excluding traditional acts of warfare.125  Only 
the Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of State and Attorney 
General can determine whether a situation falls under the 
category of a terrorist attack,126 their determination being final 
without the option of judicial review.127   
Government assistance under TRIA covers insurance losses 
exceeding the amount of $5 million.128  At that point, insurers 
  
REPORT, Dec. 6, 2002, at 4 (noting that since there are fifty states, there may 
very well be fifty different regulatory interpretations of terrorism insurance 
coverage) [hereinafter Aon Report]. 
 122. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, § 107(a)(5) 
(“Nothing in this section shall in any way limit the liability of any govern-
ment, an organization, or person who knowingly participates in, conspires to 
commit, aids and abets, or commits any act of terrorism….”).   
 123. See id. at § 201 (“Satisfaction of judgments from blocked assets of ter-
rorists, terrorist organizations, and State sponsors of terrorism.”).  See, e.g., 
Smith ex rel. Smith v. Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, 262 F. Supp. 2d 217, 
226.  See also Decision of Interest; United States District Court, Southern New 
York, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 17, 2003, at 24; Martin Flumenbaum et al., Second Cir-
cuit Review, Recovering Frozen Terrorist Assets; Attorney Work Product, N.Y. 
L.J., Dec. 2, 2003, at 3.  See also Marshal S. Shapo, Compensation for Victims 
of Terror: A Specialized Jurisprudence of Injury, 36 IND. L. REV. 237 (2003); 
Deborah M. Mostaghel, Wrong Place, Wrong Time, Unfair Treatment? Aid to 
Victims of Terrorist Attacks, 40 BRANDEIS L.J. 83 (2001).      
 124. See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, § 
103(e)(2)(A)(i).  For the Senate and House versions of this provision before the 
TRIA’s enactment, see S. 2600 § 4; H.R. 3210 §§ 3, 6(c).  See also Paul Teller, 
supra note 98. 
 125. See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, § 
102(1)(B)(i).  See also S. 2600 § 3(1)(B)(i); H.R. 3210 § 19(1)(B)(v).    
 126. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, § 102 
(1)(A). 
 127. Id. § 102 (1)(C).   
 128. Id. § 102(1)(B)(ii).  The $5 million threshold applies to the aggregate 
property and casualty insurance losses stemming from an act of terrorism, 
and not on a policy-by-policy basis.  Ugoletti, Implementing TRIA, supra note 
11, at 4.  Ugoletti also provides the following illustrative example: “if $7 mil-
lion in aggregate property and casualty losses from a certified act of terrorism 
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remain responsible for a deductible that is adjusted according to 
each year’s percentile incremental deductible increase.129  TRIA 
assesses insurers’ deductible as an amount equal to the value of 
insurers’ direct earned premiums over the calendar year multi-
plied by 7, 10 and 15% for each year the program progresses.130  
Section 103(e)(6)(A–C) also requires insurance companies to 
hold aggregate retention amounts of $10 billion, $12.5 billion 
and $15 billion.131  Therefore, the federal government’s total pos-
sible exposure would be $90 billion for the first year, $87.5 bil-
lion for the second year and $85 billion for the program’s last 
year.132   
TRIA also sets requirements for insurance companies that 
were not previously established in either House’s proposed bills.  
It places a statutory limit on premium increases to a maximum 
of 3% of the premium charged for property and casualty insur-
ance coverage under each policy.133  The legislation also requires 
that insurers send coverage notices to their insured stating the 
premium charged for claims that TRIA covers.134  This require-
ment attempts to serve as a mechanism for assisting property 
owners in deciding whether or not to purchase terrorism insur-
ance in addition to their regular property and casualty insur-
ance.135  TRIA, however, retains state commission’s regulatory 
authority over insurance companies,136 and signifies that con-
  
were distributed among 10 policy holders, those losses could contribute to an 
insurance compan[y’s] ability to access the TRIA backstop….”  Id.     
 129. See id. § 102(7)(A–E).  “Exposure…equals to the insurer’s deductible 
and 10% of insured losses in excess of the deductible.  If an insurer had $200 
million in direct earned premiums in 2002, its [2003] deductible…would be 
equal to $14 million, and 10[%] loss sharing would kick in above $14 million in 
insured losses.”  Warshawsky, supra note 12, at 5.  
 130. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, § 
102(7)(A–E).  
 131. See id. § 103(e)(6)(A–C).  See also Warshawsky, supra note 12, at 4.  
 132. Morgan O’ Rourke, Senate Passes Terrorism Insurance Bill, RISK 
MGMT. MAG., Nov. 2002, at 20.  
 133. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, § 
103(e)(8)(C). 
 134. Id. § 103(b)(2).      
 135. See NAIC Model Bulletin, at 7 (providing insurers with some assis-
tance in complying with the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002), at 
http://www.naic.org/pressroom/releases/EmergencyResponse.htm (last visited 
Jan. 23, 2004).  See also Masters, supra note 117, at 431. 
 136. Masters, supra note 117, at 427.  
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sumer waivers of terrorism insurance will not apply to states 
that have legislation requiring insurers to include standard fire 
provisions in their policies.137   
In addition, TRIA requires insurers to repay the difference 
between their marketplace aggregate retention and the aggre-
gate amount that the federal government is not compensated 
for because of the amount being within insurers’ deductibles or 
within the portion that the government does not cover.138  How-
ever, this reimbursable amount can potentially have a dimin-
ished value, as the statute further provides that if the uncom-
pensated losses exceed insurers’ aggregate retention, insurers 
are absolved of their recoupment requirement and in certain 
cases the Secretary of the Treasury has discretion to release 
insurers of their duty to reimburse the government.139                 
Under TRIA, the Secretary of the Treasury has “sole discre-
tion” over claim determinations, with no opportunity for judicial 
review.140  In fact, TRIA also bestows upon the Secretary of the 
Treasury complete power to carryout the government’s insur-
ance program, including investigating and auditing claims, es-
tablishing rules for filing claims, employing personnel and con-
tracting the government’s insurance program to other agen-
cies.141  
Because of the U.S. Treasury Department’s role, TRIA now 
stands as the U.S.’ current legal mechanism for terrorism in-
surance coverage.  However, as several Congressional reports 
  
 137. See NAIC Model Bulletin, supra note 135, at 7.  Id. at 431. 
 138. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, § 
103(e)(7)(A).  TRIA explains the recoupment of insurers’ “federal share” as 
follows:  
[T]he mandatory recoupment amount…shall be the differ-
ence between — (i) the insurance marketplace aggregate re-
tention amount…; and (ii) the aggregate amount, of all in-
surers, of insured losses during the during such period that 
are not compensated by the Federal Government because 
such losses — (I) are within the insurer deductible for the 
insurer subject to the losses; or (II) are within the portion of 
losses of the insurer that exceed the insurer deductible, but 
are not compensated pursuant to paragraph (1).  
Id.  See also id § 103(e)(1) (Paragraph (1) explains the government’s “federal 
share.”).  
 139. Id. §§ 103(e)(7)(D), 103(e)(1).   
 140. See id. § 102(1)(C). 
 141. Id. § 104(a–d).          
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have stressed the need for international templates concerning 
government-established terrorism insurance,142 other interna-
tional examples of government implemented terrorism insur-
ance procedures offer insight into conceivable national expecta-
tions and differences.  In a world where war has shifted from 
national intervention to terrorist action, the realities of terror-
ism and its threat to a nation’s security and economy constitute 
an issue of international magnitude.143  The U.K. has dealt with 
terrorist activity in major British metropolitan areas and in 
Northern Ireland.  Meanwhile, Israel’s ability to function as an 
economically viable state depends on its ability to withstand 
frequent terrorist activity.  The next section serves as a window 
on these parts of the world that have faced similar insurance 
challenges and have reached legal solutions of their own.144  
III. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM INSURANCE PERSPECTIVES 
  “Men walk almost always in the paths trodden by others, pro-
ceeding in their actions by imitation….so that if he does                                          
not attain to their greatness, at any rate                                    
he will get some tinge of it.”145                                                         
– Niccolo Machiavelli146 
A. The U.K.’s Insurance Assistance Scheme: Has History Re-
peated Itself? 
1.  The U.K.’s Private/Public Terrorist Insurance Combination   
Similar to the U.S.’ current reinsurance crisis, the U.K. faced 
an insurance industry unwilling to assume the risks of terror-
ism in the early 1990’s.147  The U.K.’s insurance industry re-
  
 142. See Lee Barnes, A Closer Look at Britain’s Pool Re, RISK  MGMT. MAG., 
May 2002, at 21.  
 143. See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, § 
101(a)(1).        
 144. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 145. NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE AND THE DISCOURSES 19–20 (Luigi 
Ricci trans., Modern Library 1950). 
 146. Niccolo Machiavelli is considered as the “first commentator of power,” 
and his work, The Prince, serves as a complex treatise in political realism.  
See id. xxvi–xxxi.       
 147. The Association of British Insurers (“ABI”) announced in a press re-
lease made in November 1992 that British insurers decided to exclude terror-
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quired minimal regulation in the past.148  However, in light of 
terrorist attacks on the British mainland throughout the 1990s, 
the government was faced with a potential economic crisis.149  In 
1992, the U.K. resolved the issue of insurance and reinsurance 
coverage for terrorism through a pool reinsurance system 
(known as “Pool Re”).150  The British Parliament passed the Ter-
rorism Reinsurance Act of 1993151 in order to establish “Pool Re-
insurance Co., Ltd.”152  This government action occurred in the 
wake of the Irish Republican Army’s (“IRA”) bombings of Bish-
opsgate and St. Mary Axe in the financial district of England.153  
The nation’s damages for both bombings were around $2 billion 
dollars.154   
  
ism insurance coverage in light of upcoming reinsurance treaties renewable 
on January 1, 1993.  Nicholas Munday, UK Commercial Property Insurance: 
Terrorism Pool Put to the Test, INT. I.L.R. 1993, 1(5), at 124.  For more general 
information on the insurance industry’s regulation in the U.K., see Ambereen 
Salamat & Jonathan Teacher, United Kingdom — General Framework and 
Conduct of Business, in THE IN-HOUSE COUNSEL’S GUIDE TO INSURANCE AND 
REINSURANCE 2003, 79 (Rob Mannix et al. eds., 2003) and the U.K.’s Financial 
Services Authority (FSA) Handbook of Rules and Guidance, available at 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/handbook (last visited Jan. 15, 2004). 
 148. See John Young, United Kingdom, in THE REGULATIONS GOVERNING 
INSURANCE: AN INTERNATIONAL GUIDE, (Euromoney Publications et al., 1991). 
 149. For an in depth analysis of the U.K.’s terrorism insurance issues in the 
1990s, see Bice, supra note 30, 446–64.      
 150. Jane Croft and Jean Eaglesham, ‘Insurer of Last Resort’ Set to Extend 
Its Cover, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), July 19, 2002, at 5.   
 151. Reinsurance Act (Acts of Terrorism), 1993, ch. 18, § 1(1) (Eng.).  See 
also Symon Ross, UK Office of Fair Trading to Exempt Pool Re from Competi-
tion Legislation, INS. DAY, Feb. 9, 2004, available at 2004 WL 57515055 (re-
porting that the U.K.’s Office of Fair Trading (“OFT”) decided that Pool Re’s 
terrorism coverage should be exempt from the nation’s competition law).  For 
a time line that displays the history of Pool Re, see Provisions of Terrorism 
and Riot Coverage in Different Countries, Astre Scor, at http://astre.scor.com 
/astrehelp/en/Assur/inc/extensionuk/terrorism.htm#Insurance (last visited 
Feb. 18, 2004) [hereinafter Astre Scor report]. 
 152. See Michael Pollack, Bills Seek Stability in Insurance for Terrorist Acts, 
N.Y. L.J., Sept. 30, 2002, at S1.    
 153. Alex Beatty, Technical Support: Political Risk; Bombs Away?, 
REINSURANCE MAG., Aug. 31, 1998, at 18; Barnes, supra note 142. 
 154. For estimates of the costs the U.K. incurred in 1993 allegedly due to 
the IRA’s bombings, see Beatty, supra note 153, at 18 (noting that the costs of 
the St. Mary Axe explosion equaled to approximately $500 million) and Bar-
nes, supra note 142, (estimating costs of the Bishopsgate explosion at $1.5 
billions dollars). 
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Pool reinsurance differs from the usual insurance practice of 
subdividing risk by spreading a specific property’s risk among 
many shareholders; rather, pooling creates a collection of nu-
merous individual risks, not individually subdivided, which are 
grouped together.155  The program specifically covers the insur-
ers of commercial properties, and residential properties in 
commercial ownership.156  Pool Re serves as a governmental in-
surance mechanism that joins insurers together under govern-
ment supervision in order to financially prepare for any poten-
tial massive losses incurred as a result of terrorism. The gov-
ernment-established Pool Re system works as a mutual insur-
ance company157 incorporated under the “Companies Acts,”158 
after having gained authorization from Britain’s Department of 
Trade and Industry (“DTI”),159 providing reinsurance coverage 
under the regulations of the “Insurance Companies Act of 
1982.”160  The British Secretary of State for Trade and Industry 
runs Pool Re as a quasi-governmental entity.161  However, a tri-
bunal oversees any challenges to the Secretary of State’s deci-
sions.162  Currently, a small staff runs Pool Re with an annual 
expense budget of £1 million (approximately $1.5 million).163      
Hence, the British Parliament intended to establish a rein-
surance arrangement that would guarantee that Britain’s in-
dustry and commerce would continue to receive terrorism in-
surance coverage.164  In this way, the British Parliament felt 
that it could assist the nation’s injured insurance industry and 
  
 155. Jaffe & Russell, supra note 14, at 4. 
 156. See Steve Atkins, UK Terrorism Insurance — Where Are We Now?, 
Insurance Institute of London, Jan. 23, 2003, at http://www.iilondon.co.uk/ 
ppt/Satkins23103.PPT (last visited Dec. 12, 2003). 
 157. Munday, supra note 147. 
 158. Companies Acts, 1985, ch. 6, § 1 (Eng.). 
 159. For more information, see the U.K.’s Department of Trade and Indus-
try web page at http://www.dti.gov.uk/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2003).   
 160. Insurance Companies Act, 1982, ch. 50 (Eng.).  See Mark Stallworthy, 
The Reinsurance (Acts of Terrorism) Act 1993, I.B.F.L. 1993, 12(3), at 21.    
 161. See Beatty, supra note 153, at 18.  Pool Re entered into a retrocession 
agreement with the U.K.’s Secretary of State for Trade and Industry on July 
30, 1993.  Astre Scor report, supra 151, at para. 10. 
 162. This tribunal consists of Pool Re representatives and government offi-
cials, and this tribunal holds the final say.  Barnes, supra note 142. 
 163. See id.; Peter Gregoire & Belinda Schofield, Insurance: A New Brand of 
Terror, LEGAL WEEK, June 5, 2003, available at 2003 WL 8422875.  
 164. See Beatty, supra note 153, at 18.    
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at the same time regain the ability to insure against terrorism 
in such a way that would also secure the State’s benefit.165  Ac-
cording to British legislative representatives, Pool Re’s estab-
lishment would also guarantee that Britain would incur “zero 
costs” for terrorism claims after several years of implementa-
tion.166  This assertion has proven accurate as Pool Re has met 
several claims without requiring any financial assistance from 
the U.K. government.167 
As a result of Pool Re’s financial soundness, the U.K. gov-
ernment’s reinsurance scheme allows for the accumulation of 
monetary funds that ultimately shelters the British government 
and Pool Re’s participant insurers from exorbitant liability ex-
posure.168  In the program’s earlier stages, Pool Re even dis-
persed its remaining yearly profits among all its participating 
entities.169  Moreover, Pool Re has worked in the U.K.’s favor 
since the government only acts as “retrocessionaire” to its own 
pool reinsurance program.170  Only the complete depletion of 
Pool Re’s financial reserves would require the government to 
cover any remaining uncovered costs, and many argue that Pool 
Re could now easily handle a major catastrophe in the U.K.171                    
  
 165. See U.K. Treasury Announcement, Changes to the Pool Re Scheme, 
July 23, 2002, at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/61876/ACF1D0D.PDF 
(last visited Jan. 15, 2004) [hereinafter U.K. Treasury Announcement]. 
 166. The Way We Live Now, CONV. & PROP. LAW, Nov/Dec 1993, at 418–20 
(noting that within its first year Pool Re was expected to have an income of 
£350 million, which shows that the government established reinsurance pool 
program could also be profitable).    
 167. See Barnes, supra note 142; HILLMAN, supra note 55, at 8.  
 168. As of December 2000, Pool Re’s accumulated surplus equaled to ap-
proximately £665 million.  Pool Re and Terrorism Insurance in Great Britain, 
TILLINGHAST-TOWERS PERRIN UPDATE, Oct. 2001, at 3, available at http://ww 
w.tillinghast.com/tillinghast/publications/publications/till_update_uk/Uk_Poo 
l_Re_and_Terrorism/2002052111.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2004) [hereinafter 
TILLINGHAST UPDATE].    
 169. As of Jan 1, 2003, Pool Re no longer provides insurers with surplus 
gains due to the program’s expansion of terrorism coverage, as the program 
now requires an increased amount of revenue in order to cover its increased 
exposure.  See U.K. Treasury Announcement, supra note 165.   
 170. See Bice, supra note 30, at 453–56.  
 171. However, the British Pool Re system has not been tested in its full 
capacity, being that very few claims materialized after the early 1990s.  See 
Andrew Cave, City — Companies Pay Double for Insurance Against Terrorism, 
DAILY TELEGRAPH, Jan. 4, 2003, at 31, available at 2003 WL 2831376. 
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Insurers in Britain wishing to offer terrorism insurance can 
group with other insurers in order to minimize the impact of 
any potential terrorist losses.  However, Pool Re requires that 
reinsurers obtain terrorism coverage for all of their portfolio 
properties, not only for their high-risk properties.172  Thus, Pool 
Re spreads the volume of risky coverage onto less risky proper-
ties nationwide.  Before gaining terrorism insurance, each in-
surer seeking terrorism coverage for their properties must be 
assessed according to three factors: (1) an insured’s aggregate 
value of total properties insured; (2) the location of the property 
at risk;173 and (3) the property’s target risk.174  Pool Re divides 
the British mainland into four zones: the first covers the U.K.’s 
highest risk areas, which covers the heart of London and 
Westminster; the second covers the rest of London as well as 
major cities and their business districts; the third encompasses 
the rest of the England except Devon and Cornwall; and the 
forth covers the U.K.’s counties and towns in the outskirts of 
the towns of Scotland and Wales.175   
The U.K. government sets insurers coverage liability based 
on Pool Re’s “retention” requirements.176  Pool Re originally set 
U.K. insurers’ terrorism coverage retention at £100,000;177 how-
ever, as of January 1, 2003, Pool Re now implements a “per 
event retention” and “annual aggregate limit” model.178  This 
model was formulated as a result of the September 11 attacks 
in order to increase terrorism insurers’ retention rates in the 
event of multiple attacks on the U.K.179  This new method caps 
  
 172. Some property owners turn to alternatives for their “single location 
basis” properties that require terrorism insurance coverage.  Pollack, supra 
note 152, at S1. 
 173. See id.  Properties located in Central London, for example, have pre-
mium rates of “0.144 percent or $144 for every $1 million of coverage.”  Id. 
 174. See Bice, supra note 30, at 451–53.   
 175. Beatty, supra note 153, at 18. 
 176. Pool Re’s retention requirements refer to the total costs that an indi-
vidual insurer bears based on the “number of heads of cover affected.”  U.K. 
Treasury Announcement, supra note 165, at 2–5.   
 177. This amount totals to $157,000.  Sarah Veysey, United Kingdom Ex-
pands the Scope of Pool Re Coverage, BUS. INS., July 23, 2002, available at 
http://www.buisnessinsurance.com/cgi-bin/news.pl?newsId=1127 (last visited 
Jan. 30, 2004).    
 178. U.K. Treasury Announcement, supra note 165, at 3. 
 179. Id.  The U.K.’s concern was based on the September 11 legal battles 
between insured owners and insurance companies with respect to the number 
 
File: IreneMacro.doc Created on:  2/14/2004 4:41 PM Last Printed: 3/29/2004 3:15 PM 
856 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 29:2 
insurers’ exposure both on a terrorist event and per annum ba-
sis.180  Insurers presently have a maximum industry-wide reten-
tion of £30 million per event and £60 million per annum.181  Fur-
thermore, these retention rates will increase annually in a pre-
determined manner up until January 1, 2006, which the British 
government and private insurance industry hope will help rein-
surers take a larger a role in terrorism insurance coverage.182   
  
of occurrences of terrorist attacks that insurance companies had to cover as a 
result of their contractual agreements with their clients.  See SR Intern. 
Business Ins. Co. Ltd. v. World Trade Center Properties L.L.C., 222 F. Supp. 
2d 385 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2002), aff’d, World Trade Center Properties, L.L.C. 
v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 345 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2003) (construing the 
World Trade Center’s insurance binder agreement as implicating that the 
insurers were responsible for the occurrences of one event and not for two).  
The U.K. has also faced the U.S.’ September 11 issue regarding the number of 
occurrences.  See Gillian D. Bell, Terrorism and Insurance, KSB Law, at 
http://www.ksblaw.co.uk/articles/property/propart13.html (last visited Jan. 
18, 2004).  The U.K. Court of Appeals handled the issue of multiple occur-
rences, stating that a single occurrence requires either the unity of time or the 
unity of place.  Mann v. Lexington Insurance Co, [2000] 2 All E.R. (Comm.) 
163; 2000 WL 976023 (QBD (Comm. Ct)), rev’d, [2001] 1 All E.R. (Comm.) 28; 
2000 WL 1421262 (CA).  See also Stempel, supra note 43, at 832–43 (analyz-
ing the number of occurrences insurance issue in the U.S. due to the Septem-
ber 11 attacks); James E. Branigan, Insurance and Risk Management in 
Commercial Real Estate Transactions: A New World of Concerns, 489 
PLI/REAL 59 (2003); Tara Loomis, WTC Attack is One Event, Judge Rules, 
LAW.COM, Sept. 26, 2002, at http://www.law.com (last visited Sept. 30, 2002); 
Michael F. Aylward, Twin Towers: The 3.6 Billion Question Arising from the 
World Trade Center Attacks; Was It One “Occurrence” or More than One?  
There Are Complexities Galore That Are Bound to Arise in Insurance Con-
tracts, 69 DEF. COUNS. J. 169 (2002).       
 180. U.K. Treasury Announcement, supra note 165, at 3 (allowing insurers 
the security of knowing exactly how much they owe in any one given year and 
per number of terrorist attacks). 
 181. Id.  
 182. Id. at 3–4 (offering a chart that displays the per event and per annum 
requirements for year up until January 1, 2006, which reports the increases 
as follows: (1) January 1, 2003 — per event: £30 million, per annum: £60 mil-
lion; (2) January 1, 2004 — per event: £50 million, per annum: £100 million; 
(3) January 1, 2005 — per event: £75 million, per annum: £150 million; and 
(4) January 1, 2006 — per event: £100 million, per annum: £200 million).  Pool 
Re’s new retention rates indicate the insurance industry’s maximum reten-
tion, but these figures do not represent each insurer’s liability, as this amount 
will bear heavily on the distribution of claims amongst insurers in the U.K.  
Id. at 4.    
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Although several property owners have decided to self-insure 
terrorism damages as a result of the program, the insurance 
industry has benefited from Pool Re overall.183 The program’s 
success sparked the British government to pass new legislation 
further extending the capacity and extent of Pool Re’s terrorism 
coverage.184  After the events of September 11, the British Par-
liament discussed the need to expand their reinsurance scheme 
in order to maximize the nation’s insurance protection, but at 
the same time create new incentives to increase commercial 
insurance competition.185    
Accordingly, the British Parliament has made monumental 
changes to the Terrorism Reinsurance Act of 1993.  The defini-
tion of what actually constitutes an act of terrorism has been 
recently altered to comprise all destructive acts meant to terror-
ize the British people and government, including domestic acts 
of terrorism taken by extremist radical groups such as new 
wave environmentalists.186  The British government has also 
expanded Pool Re’s overall coverage.  Now, Pool Re also encom-
passes destruction caused by biological contamination, aircraft 
attacks and damage by floods,187 the last of which is particularly 
necessary for Britain’s well being since any terrorist attack on 
  
 183. See William Glyon, Insurance Against Terrorism, L. SOC’Y GAZETTE, 
June 9, 1993, at 20.  
 184. Katherine Griffiths, News Analysis: Insurers Call for Greater Govern-
ment Aid to Meet Terrorism Bill; Evidence is Mounting that Lack of Terror 
Cover is Exacerbating the US Business Downturn, INDEP. (LONDON), Feb. 12, 
2002, at 15 (commenting that the “U.S. is also grappling with [the issues of 
terrorism reinsurance coverage] but it is at a less advanced stage than the 
U.K.”).  
 185. Pool Re Scheme, U.K. Parliament 73100, available at http://www.parli 
ament.the-stationary-off…0102/cmhansrd/cm020723/text/20723w21.htm (last 
visited Nov. 12, 2003).  See also U.K. Treasury Announcement, supra note 
165.   
 186. See Reinsurance (Acts of Terrorism) Act, 1993, ch. 18, § 2(2) (Eng.)  
(“[‘A]cts of terrorism’ means acts of persons acting on behalf of, or in connec-
tion with, any organisation which carries out activities directed towards the 
overthrowing or influencing, by force or violence, of Her Majesty's government 
in the United Kingdom or any other government de jure or de facto.”).  See 
also U.K. Treasury Announcement, supra note 165, at 5. 
 187. Yvette Essen, Pool Re Offers Terrorism Cover, DAILY TELEGRAPH (LON-
DON), July 24, 2002, at 29.  This expansive coverage, however, does not cover 
electronic hacking and virus damages, as the British government feels that it 
is difficult to prove that such damage actually results from a terrorist attack.  
U.K. Treasury Announcement, supra note 165, at 2.  
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London’s enormous dam could potentially flood a huge portion 
of the metropolitan area.188  In addition, the British parliament 
has made arrangements to further extend terrorism insurance 
coverage to cover nuclear contamination.189  These legal changes 
ensure the industry’s well-being and mark a savvy grasp of the 
ever expanding varieties of terrorist activity.190          
2. The U.K.’s Public Terrorism Insurance in Northern Ireland  
In Northern Ireland, however, where damages from terrorist 
activity have become part of the region’s everyday reality, most 
insurers refuse outright to assume the risk of terrorist-caused 
property damage, and this tendency especially holds true in the 
case of commercial properties.191  The Reinsurance (Acts of Ter-
rorism) Act of 1993 does not cover Northern Ireland under Sec-
tion 3(2) of the statute.192  Rather, the British government di-
rectly takes responsibility for terrorism damage recovery, acting 
as the insurer itself.193   
Two pieces of legislation require the direct payment of terror-
ist insurance claims by the British government: the Criminal 
Injuries to Properties (Compensation) Act of 1971194 and the 
  
 188. See id.  
 189. U.K. Treasury Announcement, supra note 165, at 5. 
 190. See Cave, supra note 171, at 31 (reporting that the U.K. has expanded 
it coverage in order to adapt to new terrorism concerns).  C.f. Gregory Press-
man, Attacks Require Fresh Look at Old Concepts, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 26, 2001, at 
S1 (discussing the changing concerns that exist with respect to terrorism).  
 191. See House of Lords, Manchester Bombing: Restoration of City Centre, 
U.K. Parliament, Dec. 11, 1996, available at http://www.parliament.the-
stationary-of…697/ldhansrd/vo961211/text/61211-01.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 
2004); Teresa Hunter, City – Money – Insurance – Insurers Press the Panic 
Button Alarmed by the Prospect of Chemical or …, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, Mar. 
30, 2003, available at 2003 WL 7194529.       
 192. Reinsurance Act (Acts of Terrorism), 1993, ch.18, § 3(2) (Eng.).  See 
Stallworthy, supra note 160.   
 193. Richard W. Stevenson, Britain to Help Insurers Cover Terrorism Risks, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1992, at D2.  Insurers presently provide normal insur-
ance coverage for domestic property and automobiles in Northern Ireland; 
however, a governmental compensation agency primarily reimburses the costs 
for commercial property damage caused by terrorism, and it also compensates 
victims of terrorism in Northern Ireland as well.  See Hunter, supra note 191.    
 194. Criminal Injuries to Property (Compensation) Act, N. Ir. Stat., ch. 8 
(1971).  
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Criminal Damage (Compensation) Order of 1977.195  These two 
acts obligate the British government to compensate property 
owners in Northern Ireland who are harmed by terrorist acts.196  
The government covers terrorist-caused damage claims from 
premiums paid to the government through tax revenues.197  Re-
imbursement for damages inflicted by terrorist activity requires 
three steps: (1) regional police must authenticate that terrorists 
actually caused the property damage; (2) each property owner 
must obtain a certificate proving the validity of their claim; and 
(3) owners may then establish their compensation claim against 
the British government after presenting their certificate.198       
Many insurance specialists, however, argue that this type of 
government insurance program encourages false claims.199  Brit-
ish officials have discovered numerous alleged compensation 
claims for self-inflicted damages under the rubric of terrorist 
activity.200  In fact, the British government is primarily con-
cerned with systematic fraudulent claims where IRA sympa-
thizers purposely allow the IRA to damage their property, in 
order to split governmental cash settlements with them.201  In 
addition, resentment also exists due to the government’s differ-
ing insurance approaches on the U.K. mainland and in North-
ern Ireland.202  Nevertheless, with practically no insurers cover-
ing major terrorist damages, governmental subsidy is the re-
gion’s only plausible system for redeveloping terrorist-stricken 
regions.203      
  
 195. Criminal Damage (Compensation) Order, N. Ir. Stat., No. 1247 (1977).  
 196. See Bice, supra note 30, at 463–64. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. at 449; Gloyn, supra note 183, at 20.  Presently, an act of terrorism 
that would satisfy the compensation certification requirement would be an act 
as defined by the “Terrorism Act 2000.”  Terrorism Act 2000, ch. 11 (Eng.). 
 199. Insurance specialists refer to the risk of fraudulent claims as ex post 
moral hazard.  Gollier, supra note 14, at 11 (noting that 10% of the insurance 
industry’s automobile and homeowner insurance premiums stem from fraudu-
lent claims, and that larger penalties could potentially deter policyholders 
from making fraudulent insurance claims).      
 200. Insuring Against Terror, ECONOMIST, Dec. 12, 1992, at 19. 
 201. Id. 
 202. House of Lords, Trade and Industry — Terrorism, U.K. Parliament, 
Nov. 1, 1996, available at http://www.parliament.the-stationary-of…697/cm 
hansrd/vo961101/text/61101w04.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2004).  
 203. See Hunter, supra note 191. 
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During the 1990’s, the British government was able to par-
tially remedy the issue of liability exposure through political 
and legal means.204  The U.K. government took significant steps 
to decrease the resentment that its controversial measures fos-
tered when combating the IRA.205  Due to the IRA’s terrorist ef-
forts, the U.K. had implemented many controversial mecha-
nisms for countering terrorism, such as: exclusion orders, which 
banned certain people in Northern Ireland from entering the 
U.K.’s mainland without a trial; and internment powers that 
allowed police to hold a suspect in detention without trial.206  
However, in 1997, the U.K. changed its approach in handling 
the IRA threat, when the British Parliament repealed its previ-
ous exclusion orders and internment measures.207  In addition, 
the U.K. also expanded its definition of criminal terrorism in 
order to include serious instances of terrorism.208  The ratifica-
tion of the Good Friday Peace Agreement209 minimized the 
threat of IRA terrorism due to the prospect of peace between 
the British government and Northern Ireland activists.210  Even 
though the peace agreement does not guarantee the compliance 
of other IRA splinter organizations,211 so far it has proven bene-
ficial to the British government since claims in Northern Ire-
  
 204. Richard Norton-Taylor & Duncan Campbell, Measures to Counter IRA 
Terrorism Will End, New Law Will Cover Whole UK and Broaden Terms For 
Use of Violence, GUARDIAN, Oct. 31, 1997, available at 1997 WL 14738341.  See 
also Northern Ireland: 1998–1999, BBC NEWS, Oct. 23, 2003, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/539391.stm (last visited Feb. 2, 
2004).    
 205. Norton-Taylor & Campbell, supra note 204. 
 206. Id.  See also Kieran McEvoy, Prisoners, the Agreement, and the Politi-
cal Character of the Northern Ireland Conflict, 22 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1539 
(1999); Carol Daugherty Rasnic, Northern Ireland’s Criminal Trials Without 
Jury: The Diplock Experiment, 5 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 239 (1999). 
 207. Norton-Taylor & Campbell, supra note 204. 
 208. Id.  
 209. Northern Ireland Act, 1998, ch.47, pts. I–IX.  The Good Friday agree-
ment is also known as the Belfast Agreement.  For an online version of this 
statute and more information on the Good Friday agreement, see the North-
ern Ireland Office’s website at http://www.nics.gov.uk/htbin/betsie/parser.pl/ 
0005/www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/19980047.htm#aofs (last visited Feb. 2, 
2004). 
 210. See Beatty, supra note 153, at 18. 
 211. For example, “Continuity IRA” and “True IRA” are organizations op-
posed to the U.K.’s peace offerings.  Id. 
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land have dramatically decreased.212  Nevertheless, the U.K. 
now faces a new breed of terrorist threats and has shifted its 
focus from the issues in Northern Ireland213 to the multitude of 
terrorist groups that presently threaten the nation.214 
B.  Israel’s Tax Management and Public/Private Coordination 
for the Provision of National Terrorism Insurance  
Similar to the public terrorism insurance available in North-
ern Ireland, Israel also insures for terrorism.215  The Property 
Tax and Compensation Fund216 and the Victims of Hostile Ac-
tion217 grant the government the authority to assist with terror-
  
 212. But see Bomb Rocks Enniskillen Following Call From Continuity IRA, 
HERALD COMPANY, Feb. 11, 2003, available at 2003 WL 2663929.  
 213. See Hunter, supra note 191 (reporting current terrorism concerns in 
the U.K. and Europe in general).  For an overview of the U.K.’s current issues 
with terrorism, see U.K. Cabinet Office, The United Kingdom and the Cam-
paign against International Terrorism — Progress Report, Sept. 9, 2002, at 
http://www.cabinet-office.gov.uk/reports/sept11/coi-0809.pdf (last visited Jan. 
12, 2004).  After September 11, the U.K. government’s heightened safety con-
cerns primarily focus on terrorist groups with a foreign, i.e. Middle Eastern, 
cause, as the nation’s criminal laws target foreign nationals.  See Kavita Modi 
& John Wadham, Anti-Terrorism Legislation in the United Kingdom and the 
Human Rights Concerns Arising from It, LIBERTY ORG., Mar. 31, 2003, at 
http://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/resources/articles/pdfs/terrorism-apri 
l-2003.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2004) (noting that the U.K. government’s ex-
pansion of the nation’s Terrorism Act and criminal law violates the human 
rights of many individuals).    
 214. U.K. faces terrorism from political activists representing the concerns 
of Northern Ireland, Middle East, North Africa, Kurdish Separatists, and 
other domestic groups, such as the Animal Liberation Front.  Alan J. Fleming, 
Terrorism Coverage in the United Kingdom, DJR, at http://www.drh.com/spe-
cial/wtc/w3_065.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2004).  
 215. Aside from insuring terrorism, Israeli legislation also clearly protects 
the interest of the insured in all insurance matters as, for example, the na-
tion’s laws require that insurance changes can be made only if they are favor-
able or “more beneficial” to the insured party.  See David M. Sassoon, Legal 
Aspects of Insurance, in ISRAELI BUSINESS LAW: AN ESSENTIAL GUIDE 337, 337–
39 (Alon Kaplan et al., 1996).  Israel’s Insurance Contract law of 1981 estab-
lishes these pro-consumer provisions.  Insurance Contract Law, 1981, 35 
L.S.I. 91, (1980/1981).  For an online copy of this law, see the website of Levi-
tan, Sharon & Co. at http://www.israelinsurancelaw.com/site/index.php?mod-
ule=ContentExpress&func=display&btitle=CE&mid=&ceid=61 (last visited 
Dec. 15, 2004). 
 216. Property Tax and Compensation Fund, (1961), 15 L.S.I. 101, 
(1960/1961).   
 217. Victims of Hostile Action, (1970), 24 L.S.I. 131, (1969/1970).  
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ist-caused damages.218  Through these two pieces of legislation, 
the Israeli government both funds and administers terrorism 
insurance for citizens, and in certain instances even for tour-
ists.219  Each program, however, governs a particular domain: 
the Property Tax and Compensation Fund covers property and 
casualty insurance and the Victims of Hostile Action covers life 
and health insurance.220  
Under the Property Tax and Compensation Fund, the Israeli 
government, through the Israeli Income and Property Tax 
commission,221 collects a property tax primarily from Israeli 
businesses.222  The Property Tax Commission then reimburses 
claims resulting from terrorism, but up to the property’s market 
value immediately before an attack.223  The nation’s compensa-
tion fund also covers the loss of household items at “full re-
placement value” without accounting for depreciation.224  How-
ever, due to the high number of property damage occurring in a 
commercial area after an attack, the tax commission takes on 
the role of fixing the damage through “price adjusters” and con-
  
 218. For the history behind Israel’s development of its government compen-
sation programs, see Hillel Sommer, Providing Compensation For Harm 
Caused By Terrorism: Lessons Learned in The Israeli Experience, 36 IND. L. 
REV. 335, 353–55 (2003) (starting from the nation’s formation to the present). 
 219. See Terrorism Insurance: Alternative Programs for Protecting Insur-
ance Consumers, 107th  Cong. 8 (2001), (testimony of Thomas J. McCool, Man-
aging Director of Financial Markets and Community Investment before the 
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs), available at http 
://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/gao/terrins102401mccool.pdf (last visited Jan. 
12, 2004).   
 220. Id. 
 221. For more information, see Israel’s Income and Property Tax Commis-
sion’s website at http://www.mof.gov.il/itc/eng/mainpage.htm (last visited Jan. 
5, 2004). 
 222. HILLMAN, supra note 55, at 8.   
 223. Id.  Property owners can receive compensation for all of their “real 
damages,” which means that the government reimburses the lesser amount of 
either: (1) the “difference between the value of the asset before the damage 
occurred and the market value of the asset immediately after the damage 
occurred;” or “the cost of restoring the asset to its prior condition.”  Sommer, 
supra note 218, at 356. 
 224. Sommer, supra note 218, at 355.  The Commission compensates house-
hold items such as “furniture, appliances, electronics, books, and similar 
items,” but it does not provide coverage for “jewelry, art, antiques, and cash.”  
Id. at 355, n.124.   
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tractors.225  If a property owner wishes to obtain greater cover-
age, private or additional state coverage is available in order to 
account for any discrepancies in the State’s replacement price 
evaluations.226   
Meanwhile, the Victims of Hostile Action (Pensions) Law pro-
vides coverage for the personal costs incurred from terrorist 
harm through a state program called Law for the Compensation 
of Victims of Hostile Action,227 which the National Insurance 
Institute (“NII”) administers.228  The situations that can qualify 
under this statute are quite numerous, as the legislation covers 
any harm that may occur to an Israeli citizen, resident or visi-
tor that faces harm due to a terrorist attack.229  In addition, the 
  
 225. Id. at 356.  Thus, the Israeli Tax Commission takes on the role of re-
storing terrorist stricken property, despite the fact that the Property Tax 
Compensation Fund law states that individuals are to be financially compen-
sated.  Id.  However, the nation seems to be benefiting from this administra-
tive system, as it “significantly reduces the amount of time it takes for life to 
return to normal following a terrorist attack.”  Id.    
 226. See HILLMAN, supra note 55, at 8.      
 227. See 24 L.S.I. 131–37.  See also Howard Kunreuther, The Role of Insur-
ance in Managing Extreme Events: Implications for Terrorism Coverage, BUS. 
ECON., April 2002, at 14, available at http://www.Ideo.columbia.edu/C 
HRR/Roundtable/Kureuther_Howard _Note.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2004).  
 228. In 1954, the Israeli government established the National Insurance 
Institute (“NII”) in order to administer Israel’s social security programs.  Ye-
huda Kahane, Insurance In the Israeli Economy, in ISRAELI BUSINESS LAW: AN 
ESSENTIAL GUIDE 341 (Alon Kaplan et al., 1996).  This government agency is 
responsible for the administration of various social oriented laws.  Id.  For 
example, the NII operates the following government programs: victims of hos-
tile activities compensation, military service salaries, unemployment insur-
ance, alimony provisions, coverage for work related injuries, nursing care for 
the elderly/disabled, child support, maternity leave payments and health in-
surance.  Id. at 341–42.  Israeli employers, employees and the self-employed 
primarily finance the NII’s programs, as the government requires that they 
pay “contributions” to the national program that can account for a substantial 
portion of their salary and/or earnings.  Id. at 342.  As of January 2003, the 
income ceiling for such contributions is “five times the national average wage 
for both employers and employees.”  NII Home Page, Definitions and Terms 
Used, at http://www.btl.gov.il/English/btl_indx.asp?name=pdf/pamphlets_Eng 
.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2004).  For more information, see the NII’s website 
at http://www.btl.gov.il/English/eng_index.asp (last visited Dec. 15, 2003).  See 
also National Insurance Institute, Compensation for Foreign Residents Vic-
tims of Hostile Acts, at http://www.btl.gov.il/English/btl_indx.asp?name=pdf/ 
pamphlets_Eng.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2004).  
 229. The Victims of Hostile Action (Pensions) Law defines an “enemy-
inflicted injury” in the following way: 
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legislation loosely defines terrorist acts in such a manner that it 
can even include harm caused as a result of self-defense actions 
against terrorists.230  The compensation law’s definition also 
mirrors to a certain extent the broad definition of terrorism 
found in the Israeli Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance 5708–
1948, which establishes the criminality of such acts. According 
to the Israeli criminal statute, a terrorist organization is one 
that resorts “to acts of violence” in a calculated fashion in order 
“to cause death or injury to a person” or “threats of such acts of 
violence.”231  This definition is very broad,232 which means that 
  
(1) [A]n injury caused through hostile action by military or semi-
military or irregular forces of a state hostile to Israel, through hostile 
action by an organization hostile to Israel or through hostile action 
carried out in aid of one of these or upon its instructions, on its behalf 
or to further its aims…. 
24 L.S.I. 131, § 1.  This statute also lists the individuals that can fall under 
the category of a victim of an “enemy inflicted injury” as either: (1) “an Israel 
national or resident, whether the injury was sustained in Israel or outside of 
it;” or “a person who entered Israel under a visa or permit issued under the 
Entry into Israel Law….”  Id. § 3.       
 230. Sommer, supra note 218, at 339 (explaining that Israeli legislation 
covers even “friendly fire,” “as is the accidental explosion of ammunition 
stocked in anticipation of terrorist attacks”).  However, the classification of 
what actually constitutes a “hostile act” is not clear, as harm can fall into the 
categories of either criminal or terrorist.  Id. at 340.    
 231. Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance, 1948, 1 L.S.I. 76, (1948).  See also 
Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance (Amendment) Law, 1980, 34–35 L.S.I. 211, 
(1979/1980); Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance (Amendment No. 2), 1986, 39 
L.S.I. 229, (1984/1986).  For the current English translation of the above law 
and its amendments up until 1993, see Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
website at http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH07tu0 (last visited Jan. 10, 
2004). 
 232. In fact, the statute also makes it illegal for an Israeli citizen to sympa-
thize terrorist groups by publishing, in a written or verbal manner, any words 
of praise or sympathy for terrorist groups.  See Prevention of Terrorism Ordi-
nance, 1948, 1 L.S.I. 76, (1948) at § 4.  But cf. U.S. Patriot Act 18 U.S.C.A. § 
2339(B) (section entitled “Providing Material Support or Resources to Desig-
nated Foreign Terrorist Organizations”) (emphasis added); U.S. CONST. 
amend. I (In contrast to this particular Israeli law’s approach to speech and 
association, the U.S. Constitution mandates that “Congress shall make no 
laws respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise of 
speech thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press,” which 
offers a very different national approach to the handling of opinions and ex-
pressions contrary to the State).  See also JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. 
ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1055–1306 (6th ed. 2000) (providing historical 
background and analysis for the development of free speech in the U.S.); 
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any such act is compensated under the nation’s insurance pro-
gram.  Moreover, victims also have the presumption of an oc-
currence being a terrorist attack in their favor, as the Victims of 
Hostile Action Law explains that “[w]here a person has been 
injured under circumstances affording reasonable grounds for 
believing that he [or she] has sustained an enemy inflicted in-
jury, the injury shall be regarded as enemy inflicted unless the 
contrary is proved.”233  When the National Insurance Institute 
determines that the applicant has a legitimate claim, it then 
administers the eligible victim’s compensation in a manner very 
similar to the U.S. Social Security system in that it provides 
medical care, lost wages, family assistance, and personal injury 
settlements, with the only exception being that it also applies to 
tourists visiting the nation.234                   
Nevertheless, the government limits its overall liability 
through insurance regulation, as it does not reimburse for dam-
ages that insurance companies are forced to insure by law.235  
For example, Israel does not cover certain costs such as busi-
ness interruption; in such cases, businesses can find such cov-
erage only through private insurance.236  Therefore, insurance 
companies wishing to provide their business to Israeli citizens 
are legally required to pay for their portion of damages caused 
  
Miriam Gur–Arye, Can Freedom of Expression Survive Social Trauma: The 
Israeli Experience,  13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 155 (2003).   But see Tracey 
Topper Gonzalez, Individual Rights Versus Collective Security: Assessing the 
Constitutionality of the U.S. Patriot Act, 11 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 75 
(2003). 
 233. 24 L.S.I. 132, § 2.  See also Sommer, supra note 218, at 340.   
 234. HILLMAN, supra note 55, at 8.  Israel insures practically all of the na-
tion’s residents, differing in coverage depending on age.  MEIR HETH, THE 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IN ISRAEL 72 (1967).   
 235. See HILLMAN, supra note 55, at 8. 
 236. See 15 L.S.I. 101–03 (restricting coverage to actual property damage as 
the statute does not mention business interruption as falling into one of the 
categories of reimbursable harm).  See also Kunreuther, supra note 227, at 14; 
Sommer, supra note 218, at 357 (noting that this sum also includes all indi-
rect damage such as business interruption and loss of earnings).   This limita-
tion has proved restraining as many business owners have faced up to an 80% 
deduction in reduced business as a result of the high frequency of terrorist 
activities occurring in the nation’s commercial areas.  Id. at 358.  However, 
the Israeli government has decided to potentially cover business interruption 
damages resulting from terrorism if the government approves such a claim.  
Id. at 358. 
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by any given terrorist attack.237  Through the Israeli govern-
ment’s strict division of fiscal responsibility between govern-
ment and insurers, the insurance industry can comfortably is-
sue insurance knowing in advance that they will not be respon-
sible for the entire risk of property damage. 
IV.    DOMESTIC LEGAL ANALYSIS THROUGH INTERNATIONAL      
   EXAMPLES  
“Lay plans for the accomplishment of the difficult before it     
becomes difficult;  make something big                                           
by starting with it when small.”238                                                       
– Lao Tzu, Taoist philosopher239 
A.  U.S. Government Assistance — Prudent Solution, Short 
Term Scapegoat, or a Little Bit of Both? 
A comparative legal analysis of TRIA provides important in-
sights and potential solutions to some of the problems that the 
U.S. terrorism insurance program now faces.  Part IV lays the 
foundation for this Note’s international analysis, beginning 
with a critical analysis of TRIA that explains the legislation’s 
limitations as well as its accomplishments.  This analysis is 
then followed by an international comparison of TRIA with the 
terrorism insurance programs available in Israel and the U.K.  
Through international comparison, this Note presents helpful 
solutions for TRIA’s potential renewal.  
1. National Issues That Remain Unresolved   
As terrorists coordinate their attacks to inflict maximum 
damage and devastation, they simultaneously achieve maxi-
mum exposure for their own cause.240  For this reason, the issue 
  
 237. See Sommer, supra note 218, at 358.  
 238. LAO TZU, TAO TE CHING 70 (D.C. Lao trans., 1963).   
 239. Lao Tzu, “an older contemporary of Confucius,” is believed to have 
written several anthologies based on the cultivation of the proper way of life 
and the true meaning of human virtue.  Id. at viii.  Tzu’s works, as most an-
cient Chinese philosophers, not only grapple with the ideals of the personal 
realm, but his teachings also cover politics and ethics in terms of government 
and ruling.  Id. at xxviii.      
 240. Terrorist organizations have a “hydra-like feature,” which makes them 
inherently dangerous and evasive as they can establish network characteris-
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of terrorism insurance coverage effects most dramatically the 
security of properties that either have great symbolic or practi-
cal value to the U.S.241  As a result, the unavailability of terror-
ism coverage effects the insurability of properties that fit into 
what the insurance industry classifies as “Tier 1” or “Tier 2” 
properties,242 which means that they face a higher risk of serv-
ing as targets of another terrorist attack.243  In addition, since 
the cost of terrorism insurance remains extremely high, owners 
of lower potential risk property currently refrain from purchas-
ing terrorism insurance.244  Therefore, TRIA does not insure the 
entire nation against terrorism; instead, it primarily serves as a 
mechanism for providing government reinsurance coverage for 
insurers wishing to cover properties that are commercial or 
  
tics that allow for individual actors to spontaneously act on a “common cause.”  
See Woo, supra note 20, at 3, 9 (highlighting Margaret Thatcher’s observa-
tions on the IRA media’s coverage, as she noted that the “oxygen of publicity” 
fuels the terrorist drive to inflict harm).   
 241. See Peter R. Orszag & Joseph A. Pechman, Testimony before the Sub-
committee on Cybersecurity, Science, and Research & Development and the 
Subcommittee on Infrastructure and Border Security, House Select Commit-
tee on Homeland Security, Sept. 4, 2003, at 7 (arguing for government inter-
vention), available at http://www.iwar.org.uk/cip/resources/energy/orszag09 
0403.pdf (last visited Jan. 18, 2004);  Saxton, supra note 31, at 6.  But see 
Loubier & Aro, supra note 56, at 18 (noting that terrorism can potentially 
occur anywhere and that the risk does not rest only on landmark assets).  
 242. See Mario Suarez & Steven Abrams, Outside Counsel: Terrorism Risk 
Insurance and the Real Estate Industry, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 10, 2002, at 4.  
Moody’s investor service has established terrorism risk categories in order to 
classify buildings: Tier 1 properties include genuine ‘trophy’ buildings, region-
ally well-known properties or assets located near trophy assets; Tier 2 assets 
consist of large “Class A or B-type central business district buildings and ma-
jor shopping malls;” and the Tier 3 category includes all others assets.  Id. 
 243. Id.  But see DARIUS LAKDAWALLA & GEORGE ZANJANI, INSURANCE, SELF 
PROTECTION, AND THE ECONOMICS OF TERRORISM 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., 
Working Paper No. 9215, 2002) (“Potential targets of terrorism have incen-
tives to protect themselves against attack, but rational terrorists will substi-
tute away from fortified targets and [instead shift their attention] toward[s] 
vulnerable ones.”), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/W9215.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 12, 2002).   
 244. Terrorism insurance coverage in its very essence is primarily commer-
cial insurance concern.  See Jaffe & Russell, supra note 14, at 20 (comparing 
terrorism insurance with natural catastrophe insurance, which tends to pri-
marily cover “personal homeowner insurance”).   
File: IreneMacro.doc Created on:  2/14/2004 4:41 PM Last Printed: 3/29/2004 3:15 PM 
868 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 29:2 
have a high profile status –– either symbolically or economi-
cally.245       
In fact, insurance analysis companies report that only 25% of 
owners with properties worth $100 million or more throughout 
the U.S. have elected to acquire terrorism insurance.246  Prop-
erty owners currently refrain from purchasing terrorism cover-
age because insurance companies continue to charge substan-
tial premiums for the additional coverage.247  Therefore, despite 
TRIA’s mandate that all U.S. insurance carriers must make 
  
 245. See Jaffe & Russell, supra note 14, at 20; Woo, supra note 20, at 10 
(noting that terrorist can “switch intermittently between political, commercial 
and economic targets”).  See also Goldberg, supra note 38, at 549; U.S. Office 
of Public Affairs, Treasury Department Announces Proposed Regulation Im-
plementing Claims Procedures Under the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, (quot-
ing Jeffrey S. Bragg, Executive Director of the U.S. Terrorism Risk Insurance 
program, in regards to his statement on the program’s role as a reinsurance 
provider), Nov. 25, 2003, at http://www.treas.gov/press/release/js1022.htm 
(last visited Jan. 5, 2004) [hereinafter U.S. Office of Public Affairs, TRIA An-
nouncement].  But see LAKDAWALLA & ZANJANI, supra note 243, at 17 (This 
article clarifies how the effect of terrorism on commercial properties can ulti-
mately concern the nation.  It provides the following illustrative example:  “A 
construction project founding in Manhattan due to lack of affordable insur-
ance coverage may be seen as a national public policy issue, while similar 
foundering associated with windstorm or earthquake insurance coverage is 
not.”). 
 246. Christian Murray, City Properties Lack Terror Insurance, NEWSDAY, 
Mar. 27, 2003, at A46. Interestingly enough, however, smaller and mid-sized 
companies that possess property have shown a greater tendency to purchase 
terrorism coverage since terrorism insurance is less costly for properties in 
their price bracket.  Id.  See also Barbara Pinckney, Response to Terrorism 
Insurance is Underwhelming, BUS. REV., April 21, 2003, at http://www.biz 
journals.com/albany/stories/2003/04/21/story2.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2004); 
Jon Chesto, Few Seek Terrorism Insurance, BOSTON HERALD, Feb. 24, 2003, at 
23.  Due to the limited purchasers of terrorism insurance, insurers complain 
about the costs TRIA imposes by requiring stringent notification standards.  
Sam Friedman, Terrorism Rate Hikes To Fall To Single-Digits, NAT. 
UNDERWRITER — PROP. & CASUALTY, Nov. 10, 2003, available at LEXIS, Nexis 
News & Bus. Library.  The U.S. Treasury Department has also taken notice of 
the nation’s low rate of terrorism insurance purchases even after TRIA’s en-
actment.  See Ugoletti, Implementing TRIA, supra note 11, at 6.     
 247. See John W. Schoen, Firms Still Shun Terror Insurance, MSNBC, Feb. 
24, 2003, available at http://msnbc.msn.com/Default.aspx?id=3073016&p1=0 
(last visited Jan. 1, 2004).  See, e.g., Jill Cueni-Cohen, School Board Declines 
Insurance for Terrorism, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Feb. 5, 2003, at N8.  But 
see, e.g., Jill Cueni-Cohen, Districts Insure Against Terrorism, PITTSBURGH 
POST-GAZETTE, Jan. 29, 2003, at N2.  See also Bragg, supra note 9, at 15.   
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terrorism insurance “available” to their customers in a manner 
that offers protection similar to other property insurance plans, 
prices remain high.248   
Premiums remain elevated because insurers find themselves 
in a situation that insurance specialists refer to as ex ante 
moral hazard.249  Insurers raise their premiums because terror-
ist-risk mitigation still remains inefficient.250  Although such 
price setting may prove reasonable for the insurance industry, a 
limited amount of consumer force regulates the premiums and 
deductibles that insurers need to pay while participating in 
TRIA’s government insurance program.251  TRIA establishes the 
insurance industry’s deductible for claim payments,252 but it 
  
 248. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, § 103(c).  
However, the U.S. treasury is currently evaluating whether to continue 
TRIA’s “mandatory availability” provision for upcoming insurance contracts 
that are approaching renewal.  See U.S. Office of Public Affairs, Treasury An-
nounces Administrative Changes to the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program, 
Dec. 23, 2003, at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/js1067.htm (last visited 
Jan. 5, 2004).  Commercial insurance lines tend to face less government regu-
lation as commercial insurance firms “appear to be less willing and perhaps 
less able to marshal public protests against unfair premiums.”  Jaffe & Rus-
sell, supra note 14, at 20.   
 249. “Ex ante moral hazard” refers to insurers’ anticipation of a low degree 
of risk prevention and a greater frequency of losses, which ultimately results 
in higher premiums.  Gollier, supra note 14, at 10.  In general, however, 
“moral hazard” describes an insurer’s increased probability of loss due to poli-
cyholders’ “carelessness” in mitigating an insured potential harm.  Kun-
reuther, supra note 227, at 9.  The issue of moral hazard poses a significant 
dilemma for the insuring of terrorism under TRIA, as Professor Kunreuther 
explains that “[i]t is…extremely difficult to control behavior once a person is 
insured.”  Id. at 9.  Government assistance, on the one hand, helps influence 
self-protection by encouraging the purchase of terrorism insurance, but, on 
the other hand, such policies can also discourage self-protection as insurance 
can cover most of a policy holder’s potential losses, making it more efficient to 
refrain from any further protection expenditures.  LAKDAWALLA & ZANJANI, 
supra note 243, at 2.  
 250. See Kunreuther, supra note 227, at 10. 
 251. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL 
THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 39 (Yale University Press, 1986) (noting that local 
consumer groups are less organized and financed than the U.S. insurance 
industry to truly influence state insurance legislation).  See also FEDERAL-
STATE REGULATION OF THE PRICING AND MARKETING OF INSURANCE 8–9 (Paul W. 
MacAvoy ed., 1977) (discussing the regulation of property-liability insurance 
companies in the U.S.); Jaffe & Russell, supra note 14, at 20. 
 252. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, § 102(7).  
But see Department of Treasury, 68 Fed. Reg. No. 40, 9815 (Feb. 28, 2003) (to 
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does not regulate the insurance industry’s premiums.253  Most 
importantly, however, if the insurance industry’s deductibles 
prove low, the U.S. will assume much of the financial burden of 
another terrorist attack.254  In other words, taxpayers will have 
to pay the cost of an attack despite the insurance mechanisms 
currently available.255    
For insurers that have the capacity to provide terrorism in-
surance at reasonable, albeit still high, rates, TRIA also creates 
a discrepancy between different states’ coverage.256  TRIA re-
quires that each insurer’s terrorism insurance cover items that 
fall within its usual property and casualty coverage plans.257  
However, each state has its own regulations on matters that 
insurance companies must cover in their plans.258  As a result, 
  
be codified at 31 C.R.F. pt. 50) (noting that the government is currently inves-
tigating special purpose entities that insurance companies may be establish-
ing in order to circumvent paying their deductible requirements). 
 253. See Pinckney, supra note 246; Tamara Loomis, Rates Mixed After Ter-
ror Insurance Act, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 11, 2003, at 1.  See also Murray, supra note 
246, at A46 (providing the insurance industry’s perspective on this matter of 
premium regulation and highlighting the fact that many insurers still do not 
feel that they have the capital necessary to comfortably price terrorism). 
 254. Howard B. Epstein & Theodore A. Keyes, Corporate Insurance Law; 
The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002: Analysis and Review, N.Y. L.J., 
Sept. 8, 2003, at 3.  See Gollier, supra note 14, at 23 (explaining that effective 
government assistance requires that the government’s deductibles in offering 
reinsurance coverage should also correspond to the insurance market’s capac-
ity).   
 255. See BROWN ET AL., FEDERAL TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE 8 (Nat’l Bureau 
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9271, 2002), available at http://www. 
nber.org/papers/w9271 (last visited Nov. 12, 2002). 
 256. See Aon Report, supra note 121 at 4.  See also ABRAHAM, supra note 
251, at 37 (pointing out the disorganization of state insurance legislation due 
to the variations present from state to state). 
 257. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, § 103(c). 
 258. McCarran–Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (2000).  Terrorism 
Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, § 106(a).  Treasury Depart-
ment, Interim Guidance Concerning Definition of Insurers, Scope of Insurance 
Coverage, and Disclosures Mandated by the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, 
13–14 (listing each states’ residual market mechanism); Treasury Depart-
ment, Interim Guidance Concerning New Statutory Disclosure Mandatory 
Availability Requirements of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, 5 
(explaining TRIA’s “make available” requirement as applied to each state’s 
insurance laws).  See also PMA Insurance Group, Terrorism Risk Insurance 
Act of 2002: Outline (noting that the states retain their authority to allow 
insurance companies to reinstate terrorism exclusion clauses in their prop-
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many property owners may have a “false sense of security” 
about the terrorism coverage that their insurance provider of-
fers them.259  In the event of another terrorist attack, insurance 
companies may have opportunities to make use of such legisla-
tive loopholes to their clients’ detriment.260  In addition, since 
the legislation is silent on the states’ role in regulating terror-
ism insurance coverage, tension between federal and state law 
may also arise.261   
Thus, the issue remains: what happens to property owners 
who choose to refrain from obtaining terrorism insurance?262   In 
  
erty/casualty policies), at http://www.pmagroup.com/risk_tria_legislationsu 
mmary.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2004); Bragg, supra note 9, at 15.   
 259. See US Insurance Review; US Insurance Stars Aim to Earn Stripes, 
POST MAG., Dec. 4, 2003, at 16 (noting the limitation of terrorist acts that 
TRIA includes in its definition of terrorism) [hereinafter Insurance Review].  
For example, the typical model consumer disclosure forms, which most insur-
ers used to notify their clients, do not specify any state law implications on 
terrorism insurance coverage.  Sample disclosure forms can be found on the 
Treasury Department’s website at http://www.treas.gov/offices/domestic-
finance/financial-institution/terrorism-insurance/press/ (last visited Jan. 5, 
2004) and on the NAIC website at http://www.naic.org/pressroom/release/ 
dislcoseonefinal.pdf or http://www.naic.org/pressroom/release/disclosetwofinal  
.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2004).   
 260. See Myra E. Lobel, Current Issues in Drafting Reinsurance Contracts, 
854 PLI/COMM 7, 39 (2003) (noting that there are currently many variations 
on “TRIA clauses,” but due to the lack of significant case law on the subject 
the interpretation and enforceability of such clauses remain unclear).  An 
important issue that remains unresolved is how TRIA’s mandated terrorism 
coverage integrates with other coverage issues within an insurance policy.  
Aon Report, supra note 121, at 6.   For example, some states require property 
insurance to include fire-damage in their policies; however, in a state that 
does not have such a requirement, it remains questionable whether a fire-
related damage due to a terrorist attack will qualify.  See id.   
 261. See, e.g., Department of Treasury, 68 Fed. Reg. No. 40, 9815 (Feb. 28, 
2003) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 50) (noting that federal law currently 
provides limited requirements or standards for approving insurers that can 
fall under TRIA’s mandate).   
 262. Insurance professionals call this issue the “Samaritan’s dilemma,” 
whereby the government finds itself in a difficult position when faced with 
victims who have not taken precautionary steps and those who prudently 
protected themselves in advance.  BROWN ET AL., supra note 255, at 11.  Nev-
ertheless, a national policy or program helps establish a system that offers 
incentives for “preventative measures” and expedites the compensation proc-
ess in the event of a terrorist attack.  Id.  But see Orszag & Pechman, supra 
note 241 (posing the line-drawing question of: “[w]here does the regulatory 
process stop?”).   
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effect, TRIA creates an “adverse selection” issue.263  In the case 
of U.S. property terrorism insurance coverage, the adverse se-
lection problem relates to owners who weigh their chances in 
favor of not insuring their properties against terrorism-related 
harm.264  There are three categories of property owners who de-
cide to sidestep terrorism insurance coverage: those who con-
sider their chance of facing a terrorist attack as minimal; those 
who acknowledge a possibility, but choose to self-insure their 
property; and/or those who weigh their losses in the hope that 
the government will ultimately intervene and assist in their 
recovery from any terrorist act.265  Accordingly, the U.S. gov-
ernment faces a host of uninsured properties and may encoun-
ter a significant financial burden should there be another ter-
rorist attack.  As a result, the nation may struggle with the 
same challenge of providing additional financial relief to victims 
in the event of another terrorist attack,266 which is the very 
  
 263. See Bragg, supra note 9, at 15.  Adverse selection occurs when those 
with a greater potential for risk disproportionately seek the protection of in-
surance coverage.  Kunreuther, supra note 227, at 8.  As a result insurers face 
yielding a “negative expected return” on their insurance portfolio policies.  Id. 
 264. Terrorism insurance in the U.S. currently displays what insurance 
experts would refer to as an “extreme case” of adverse selection as agents who 
face a lower terrorism-related risk consider even the current terrorism insur-
ance premiums too high, and instead choose not to insure the risk at all.  See 
Gollier, supra note 14, at 9.   
 265. See, e.g., Civia Katz, Penn Discusses Terrorism Insurance, INTELL- 
IGENCER J., July 16, 2003, at B7 (reporting that a Pennsylvania township de-
clined to spend $522 for terrorism insurance coverage, as their other policies 
increased from 17 to 137%); Kate Alexander, County May Pass on Terror In-
surance, AUSTIN AM. STATESMAN, Dec. 23, 2003, at B1 (setting aside reserves 
to cover any potential terrorist threat).  See also Insurance Review, supra note 
259, at 16 (indicating that 44% of property owners who are advised to obtain 
terrorism insurance refrain from making such a purchase); Sarah Veysey, 
Governments Providing Terror Coverage Backstops: But a Specialist Terrorism 
Insurer Closes to New Business Due to Lack of Demand, 37 BUS. INS. 23 
(2003), available at 2003 WL 9138389 (reporting that although nations — 
such Germany, Austria, France, Spain, and the U.K. — have assisted in the 
availability of terrorism insurance, many property owners still refrain from 
purchasing such cover).  
 266. See Gollier, supra note 14, at 16 (noting that social pressures after a 
catastrophic event will strongly press for the government indemnification of 
uninsured victims).   
File: IreneMacro.doc Created on: 2/14/2004 4:41 PM Last Printed: 3/29/2004 3:15 PM 
2004] TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE ACT OF 2002 873 
situation that the U.S. government intended TRIA to address 
and may ultimately prove extremely costly to tax payers.267  
Commentators have also noted that TRIA reduces property 
owners’ incentive to mitigate the risks and damages associated 
with terrorism.268  In fact, insurance at high premiums tends to 
signal the stark reality behind these observations.269  Many of 
the properties that are receiving the benefit of terrorism insur-
ance have limited mechanisms to protect their buildings and 
occupants from another terrorist attack.270  For example, a 
commercial building may have financial coverage for terrorism 
related property and casualty losses, but its property owners at 
the same time may have taken few steps to mitigate the harm.271  
This discrepancy means that TRIA may protect the insurance 
industry from facing a fatal blow, but it does not necessarily 
  
 267. See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, § 
101(b)(1). 
 268. LAKDAWALLA & ZANJANI, supra note 243, at 1 (arguing that government 
subsidizing of terrorism coverage can potentially keep agents from protecting 
themselves, which in turn raises vulnerability).  Cf. Geoffrey Heal & Howard 
Kunreuther, You Can Only Die Once 12–13 (April 12, 2002) (paper prepared 
for the “Risk Management Strategies in an Uncertain World Conference,” 
Palisades, N.Y.) (noting that insurance in theory should serve as a mechanism 
for encouraging airlines to heighten security, but instead can potentially pro-
duce the opposite effect of free-loading security by airlines who face less strin-
gent requirements for their own insurance coverage), available at 
http://www.Ideo.colombia.edu/CHRR/Roundtable/Kunreuther_white.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 10, 2002).  See also BROWN ET AL., supra note 255, at 6 (noting that 
“the virtues of unfettered markets is the incentives they generally provide for 
market actors to invest and behave in a socially optimal fashion”). 
 269. See Kureuther, supra note 227, at 8–12. 
 270. See Thomas P. Bloch, Commercial Real Estate Leases: Selected Issues 
in Drafting and Negotiating in Current Market, SH008 ALI–ABA 277, 280–82 
(2003) (suggesting lease provisions for commercial landlords).  Landlords have 
begun to include lease provisions that provide exceptions for service interrup-
tion caused by a whole array of potential terrorist-risks and are spreading the 
costs of additional security measures through lease provisions that allow for 
rent escalations based on heightened security measures.  Id.  But see 
LAKDAWALLA & ZANJANI, supra note 243, at 4 (suggesting that enhanced secu-
rity measures can also theoretically lead to an increase of terrorist funding as 
terrorists may take such actions as a sign of insecurity, which marks an ac-
complishment that they will seek to repeat). 
 271. “In fact, insurers could find it in their best interest to earn the good 
will of their clients by treating claimants generously at the expense of the 
government.”  BROWN ET AL., supra note 255, at 7. 
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indicate that the people occupying these insured spaces are be-
ing protected. 
Another important characteristic of TRIA is that it also looks 
at terrorism as being perpetuated by foreign groups.272  The U.S. 
government considers terrorist groups, such as the one involved 
in the September 11 attacks, as international.273  TRIA’s defini-
tion of terrorism is thus quite specific in contrast to the ISO’s 
general terrorism exclusion clauses,274 and may leave potential 
targets of domestic terrorism, such as the small airplane crash 
in Florida275 or even Timothy McVeigh’s Oklahoma bombing, 
uncovered altogether, rendering government intervention in 
effect obsolete.   
The lending industry also has some serious reservations 
about TRIA, as the legislation does not provide any specifica-
tions that protect lenders.276  TRIA requires that insurers notify 
their insurance carriers, but nowhere does it state that the 
lender securing a mortgage for each property also needs notifi-
cation.277  Accordingly, lenders argue that TRIA does not foster 
communication between insurers and lenders.278  This lack of 
information has proven troubling to lenders as the law does not 
  
 272. See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, § 
102(1)(A)(iv).       
 273. See id.  See also H.R. 3210 § 19(1) (definition of an “act of terrorism”); 
S. 2600 § 3(1), (definition of an “act of terrorism”).  
 274. See supra Part II (elaborating on the issues regarding the ISO’s defini-
tion of terrorism).  See also Emanuel Gross, Democracy in the War Against 
Terrorism — The Israeli Experience, 35 LOY. L.A. L. Rev. 1161, 1162 (2002) 
(commenting on the definition of terrorism).     
 275. See An Explosive Situation, INS. DAY, Jan. 8, 2002, available at LEXIS, 
Nexis News & Bus. Library (discussing the light aircraft crash into the Bank 
of America forty-two story building in Tampa, Florida, which involved an 
American youth having allegedly sympathized with Osama bin Laden’s 
cause).     
 276. See Kenneth M. Block & Jeffrey B. Steiner, Terror Insurance Uncer-
tainty Still Exists Despite New Federal Law, N.Y. L.J., July 16, 2003, at 5; 
Epstein & Keyes, supra note 254, at 3.  For an overview of lender attorneys’ 
new insurance considerations as a result of September 11, see Goldberg, supra 
note 38, at 548–51. 
 277. Block & Steiner, supra note 276.  See generally Terrorism Risk Insur-
ance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297. 
 278. At this time, lenders must directly contact their borrowers in order to 
figure out whether their borrowers have obtained terrorism insurance for 
their mortgaged properties.  Block & Steiner, supra note 276.    
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require notification of their borrowers’ decision to insure or re-
frain from insuring against terrorism.279  
2. TRIA’s Accomplishments               
Although TRIA still has many issues that must be resolved in 
order to be fully effective, the government program that the leg-
islation established does alleviate some of the major problems 
that the insurance industry had in underwriting terrorism, es-
pecially for trophy buildings and large commercial projects.  
Since terrorist threats to property primarily stem from the 
unique political positions of target nations,280 the political com-
ponent of insuring terrorist risk makes terrorism coverage un-
favorable to insurance and reinsurance companies,281 because 
terrorist activity directly correlates to government action and 
not pure probability,282 which insurers rely on and have learned 
  
 279. Id.  Lenders now complain that TRIA fails to ensure that terrorism 
insurance be “available” to lenders, as borrowers have the option to decline 
terrorism coverage if their loan documents do not require it.  Id.  Nonetheless, 
lenders do have the opportunity to contractually resolve these matters in their 
loan documents and negotiations.    
 280. For example, U.S. involvement in the Middle East has driven many 
terrorist groups, such as Al’ Qaeda, to seek vengeance against American cul-
ture and economy.  See Yang Razali Kassim, Is the Fight Against Terrorism on 
the Right Track?, BUS. TIMES (SINGAPORE), Jan. 18, 2003, available at 2003 
WL 2349714.  See also US Foreign Policy Amounts to International Terrorism 
– Chomsky, TWN, Feb. 2, 2002, at http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/pa4.htm 
(last visited Feb. 12, 2004).  The U.K. faces dual terrorist opposition from the 
IRA’s defiance towards the British government’s stronghold in Northern Ire-
land as well as constant terrorist threats from groups adamantly against the 
nation’s Middle East foreign policy, especially due to the nation’s alliance with 
the U.S. and Israel.  See Fleming, supra note 214.  Meanwhile, territorial 
disputes spark constant conflict between Israelis and groups supporting the 
Palestinian cause.  See Amanda Rogers, Where is ‘Palestine’? Country-less 
people live in West Bank, Gaza, FORT-WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Jan. 13, 2004, 
available at 2004 WL 56484224.  
 281. For a more detailed discussion of this matter, see supra Part II.  
 282. See Orszag & Pechman, supra note 241, at 2–3 (arguing for govern-
ment intervention).  The financial exposures that the private industry faces 
proves troubling as U.S. bankruptcy laws limit corporation and individual’s 
financial exposure to terrorism caused losses, which serves to limit the private 
sector’s incentive to take preventative precautions.  Id. at 3–4.  
File: IreneMacro.doc Created on:  2/14/2004 4:41 PM Last Printed: 3/29/2004 3:15 PM 
876 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 29:2 
to calculate.283  TRIA has been instrumental in promoting: (1) 
investment and construction by providing insurers the financial 
safety net of reinsurance necessary as the problem of insurabil-
ity still troubles the reinsurance industry;284 and (2) seeks to 
limit the repercussions of prolonged political involvement in the 
private sector.285   
Implementing national terrorism risk-exposure legislation is 
undoubtedly a costly endeavor given the near impossibility of 
quantifying the consequences of a major terrorist attack;286 fur-
thermore, the financial aspects of the “catastrophic risk”287 po-
tential of terrorist attacks urge the need for the government’s 
intervention.288  Large financial reserves, however, prove diffi-
cult for insurers to accumulate due to the uncertainty of a po-
tential “early hit” that may require more financial backing than 
the limited amounts that the insurance industry can raise 
within a short time.289  Infrequency, coupled with high losses, 
  
 283. See Stempel, supra note 43, at 877 (noting that the insurance industry 
needs to develop analytical mechanisms that will assist underwriters in as-
sessing the risk of terrorism).  
 284. See Kunreuther, supra note 227, at 7.  See also BROWN ET AL., supra 
note 255, at 5; Suarez & Abrams, supra note 242. 
 285. See Sarah Bagnall & Nicholas Wood, Insurers Seek Bomb Cover Safety 
Net; Terrorist Bomb Blasts, TIMES (LONDON), Dec. 5, 1992, available at 1992 
WL 10918367 (noting the concerns the U.K. government had when establish-
ing Pool Re). 
 286. Actuaries are still struggling with the challenge of pricing commercial 
insurance for terrorism coverage.  News Round-Up; Actuaries Face Pricing 
Challenge, REINSURANCE MAG., Dec. 17, 2003, at 9.  See also TRIA ‘Has Helped 
the US Economy’, INS. DAY, Nov. 28, 2003, available at LEXIS, Nexis News & 
Bus. Library (noting the insurance industry’s present discomfort with the 
underwriting of terrorism).  
 287. For a general discussion of what actually constitutes a “catastrophic 
risk,” see John D. Pollner, Catastrophe Risk Management: Using Alternative 
Risk Financing and Insurance Pooling Mechanisms, WORLD BANK, available 
at http://econ.worldbank.org/view.php?type=5&id=1421 (last visited Nov. 21, 
2003).    
 288. See Gollier, supra note 14, at 21. 
 289. Id.  Insurance companies depend on their ability to transfer wealth 
through time in order to diversify their potential risks.  Id. at 23.  Further-
more, corporate finance frowns upon firms holding large financial reserves 
because, in corporate world views, such accumulation of capital is a sign of 
inefficiency.  Id.  This corporate reality, therefore, makes it difficult for insur-
ance companies to accumulate large monetary reserves.  Id.  Insurance com-
panies can also use capital markets in order to obtain the reinsurance backing 
necessary to cover terrorism; however, the securitization of terrorist and 
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necessitates large permanent reserves,290 but high taxes levied 
on such monetary reserves also would make it impractical for 
insurers to assume such responsibility.291  For this reason, the 
U.S. and its international counterparts have chosen to inter-
vene in terrorism coverage, especially when the insurance in-
dustry finds its reserves already depleted. 
Specifically, TRIA now ends the insurance industry’s hunt for 
reinsurance backing, as the U.S. itself serves as the reinsurer.292  
The government insurance program currently provides the in-
surance industry with the liquidity it needs in order to insure 
terrorism.293  For example, rebuilding costs for a property such 
as the Empire State Building would require over $2 billion.294  
TRIA now allows for the insurability of such properties and in 
effect keeps insurers in the picture until they can feel comfort-
able with underwriting the risk for themselves.295  In addition, 
insurers’ terrorism insurance premiums have in fact de-
creased,296 which has allowed for the provision of the terrorism 
  
catastrophic risks in general are not presently developed enough in order to 
financially support the insurance coverage of potential U.S. terrorism.  BROWN 
ET AL., supra note 255, at 4.  See also Johnson, Gentlemen’s Agreement, supra 
note 59, at 21 (explaining insurers’ need to reduce their own reserve retention 
through reinsurance); Pollner, supra note 287, at 9.   
 290. See Pollner, supra note 287, at 19.  However, certain insurance compa-
nies insuring terrorism in the U.S. may be utilizing special purpose entities in 
order to circumvent paying their deductibles, which can potentially limit the 
amount that TRIA can save in government reserves.   See Department of 
Treasury, 68 Fed. Reg. No. 40, 9815, (Feb. 28, 2003) (to be codified at 31 
C.R.F. pt. 50). 
 291. See Jaffe & Russell, supra note 14, at 12 (noting that the “U.S. tax 
rules require full taxation of profits that are being retained as reserves 
against future losses” due to terrorist-inflicted property damage).   
 292. See Terrorism Risk Insurance Program; Initial Risk Insurance Pro-
gram; Initial Claims Procedures, 68 Fed. Reg. No. 230, 67101, (Dec. 1, 2003) 
(to be codified at 31 C.R.F. pt. 50); U.S. Office of Public Affairs, Remarks by 
Peter R. Fisher, Implementing the Terrorism Insurance Risk Act of 2002, Jan. 
29, 2003, at http://wwwtreas.gov/press/releases/kd3810.htm (last visited Jan. 
5, 2004).        
 293. See Suarez & Abrams, supra note 242, at 4. 
 294. Jacqueline S. Gold, Terror Insurance Fall Short; Despite New Law, 
Landmark Buildings Can’t Get Full Coverage, CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS., Jan. 13, 
2003, at 1 (highlighting the price ranges of New York city properties that are 
“classic” terrorist targets).  
 295. See Orszag & Pechman, supra note 241, at 8.   
 296. Terrorism insurance premiums are now 50% lower than before TRIA’s 
enactment, and various insurance surveys report that premiums for terrorism 
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insurance coverage required by major construction projects and 
mortgage lenders of commercial properties.297  
Governments that choose — or rather are required — to in-
tervene in terrorism insurance coverage must also prevent tem-
porary assistance from becoming a permanent subsidy,298 all the 
while balancing other national economic needs, especially dur-
ing times of international insecurity.299  The U.S. government 
designed TRIA in a manner that will hopefully allow the insur-
ance market to gradually take on a larger role in terrorism in-
surance coverage.300  Insurer’s deductibles are set to increase 
incrementally every year, and the legislation requires that 
TRIP work closely with NAIC.301  
The coalition between the U.S. Treasury Department and the 
insurance industry creates a means of communication between 
insurance companies and the U.S. government,302 which in turn 
makes the government insurance program much more effi-
cient.303  Several reinsurance companies now provide terrorism 
  
insurance fall “between 10 to 30 percent of a property’s overall property-
casualty premiums.”  Epstein & Keyes, supra note 254, at 3. 
 297. See Goldberg, supra note 38, at 549.  
 298. See BROWN ET AL., supra note 255, at 8. 
 299. See id.  See also Gollier, supra note 14, at 27 (noting that nations inter-
vene in the case of catastrophic risk coverage “[d]ue to [the State’s] natural 
creditworthiness and its long time horizon, [it] is better shaped than insur-
ance companies to smooth shock over time”).  
 300. Terrorism Risk Insurance Program; Initial Risk Insurance Program; 
Initial Claims Procedures, 68 Fed. Reg. No. 230, 67100, (Dec. 1, 2003) (to be 
codified at 31 C.R.F. pt. 50).   
 301. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, § 103(e)(6). 
 302. See Dennis Kelly, Treasury Issues Payment Procedures for Terrorism 
Insurance Backstop, BESTWIRE, Dec. 2, 2003, available at LEXIS, Nexis News 
& Bus. Library.  See also Ugoletti, Implementing TRIA, supra note 11, at 6.    
 303. Not only does the collaboration between the insurance industry and 
government make government insurance coverage more efficient, it also en-
hances the focus on preventing future terrorist attacks.  As the insurance 
underwriting industry is currently generating methods of assessing the ter-
rorist-related risk in insuring property, these underwriting efforts also keep 
the private sector informed as to national security concerns and measures 
that the government takes to mitigate such concerns.  For example, risk as-
sessment companies, such as AIR Worldwide Corp., have accepted the oppor-
tunity to attempt to calculate the risk of terrorism with the help of experts in 
the FBI, CIA and U.S. Defense department.  Schoen, supra note 247.  Had 
such public/private interaction been in place prior September 11, perhaps 
there would have been a greater public awareness of the terrorist risk that the 
nation would ultimately face.  For example, in 2000, the Pentagon conducted 
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deductible coverage for insurers who participate in the pro-
gram, which signals that the reinsurance industry remains in 
the picture, despite the U.S. government’s intervention.304  Ac-
cordingly, it seems that TRIA does not necessarily serve as a 
bailout for the insurance industry;305 rather, U.S. government 
involvement lays the foundations of the terrorism underwriting 
process as the insurance industry builds the expertise and ca-
pacity to cover such claims for themselves.306     
B.  International Lessons on National Insurance Programs  
In order to decrease economic vulnerability to potential ter-
rorist attacks, nations need to provide their own insurance 
mechanisms.307  As Part III of this Note illustrated, different 
nations have their own unique ways of handling the threat of 
terrorism.  National government insurance implementation var-
ies greatly according to each nation’s needs.  The U.K. and Is-
rael have already developed their own means of supplying ter-
rorism risk insurance in manners that best support the needs of 
their nations.  In Israel and in Northern Ireland, public insur-
ance assistance affords property compensation for victims who 
  
an undercover study titled “Terror 2000,” which the U.S. government coordi-
nated in order to inform the intelligence sector about potential terrorist 
threats.  Woo, supra note 20, at 16.  “One of the prescient conclusions of the 
study” presented at this meeting forewarned that terrorist groups imminently 
would attempt to “conduct simultaneous bombings, perhaps in different coun-
tries, to maximize the devastation and publicity.”  Id.  The study’s message 
fell on deaf ears as such a devastating prospect seemed unrealistic.  Id.  Post-
September 11, both the U.S. government and insurance industry now enjoy 
the advantages of hind-site, and such reports will probably be taken much 
more seriously in the future.  Furthermore, the private sector’s involvement in 
terrorism insurance coverage will also demand such government reporting in 
order to prevent terrorist-related insurance losses.              
 304. See Terrorism — Tackling a Burning Issue, REINSURANCE, Aug. 11, 
2003, at 36, available at 2003 WL 66909703 [hereinafter Tackling a Burning 
Issue].  
 305. Cf. Barnes, supra note 142 (noting that the similar public/private in-
surance scheme established in the U.K. does not serve as a mere bail out for 
the insurance industry).   
 306. See Graydon S. Staring, Law of Reinsurance pt. 5, § 23:6, para. 3 
(2003); BROWN ET AL., supra note 255, at 8. 
 307. See Wastell & Elliot, supra note 19; Jorn Madslien, Insurance Industry 
Adjusts, BBC NEWS, Sept. 2, 2002, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/in_depth/wo 
r…02/september_11_one_year_on/2207645.stm (last visited Jan. 5, 2004). 
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face the devastation of terrorism on a more frequent basis.  
Meanwhile, on the British mainland, the U.K. government sup-
plies insurers with the reinsurance backing necessary to keep 
the nation’s insurance industry involved in terrorism coverage.  
These international models serve as the ideal typological tem-
plates for government intervention as each has dealt with the 
insurance issues that presently plague the U.S.  In order to be 
economically prepared for a future terrorist attack, the U.S. 
government should renew the legislation, but only after consid-
ering certain alterations that would improve the government 
program’s effectiveness. The U.K. and Israeli models provide 
the necessary solutions.               
1. The Governmental Power to Tax:  An Incentive  
All in Its Own  
In terms of financial risk management, Northern Ireland and 
Israel’s current insurance programs spread the risk of terrorism 
nationwide, with multiple taxes supporting such an insurance 
option.308  Terrorism insurance in Northern Ireland, for exam-
ple, seems beneficial since it allows for the entire U.K. to as-
sume the particular region’s risks.309  However, such an assump-
tion of risk is only viable for limited regional coverage, as evi-
denced by the U.K.’s limitation to Northern Ireland,310 because 
geographic expansion of government responsibility would re-
quire an overwhelming tax base, thus raising implementation 
costs to overwhelming levels.311  Meanwhile, a national taxation 
solution such as Israel’s seemingly alleviates the burden on ma-
jor metropolitan areas, but at a cost to the nation overall.312  De-
spite the fact that a purely public national terrorism insurance 
  
 308. However, Israel has changed its governmental insurance coverage with 
respect to foreign trade risks in order to serve as the reinsurer of last resort to 
insurance companies bearing the initial burden of such claims.  See Foreign 
Risk Up for Privatization and Split Up, ISRAELI BUS. TODAY, Mar. 31, 1998, 
available at 1998 WL 10113749.    
 309. See Bice, supra note 30, at 463–64. 
 310. See id. 
 311. Id. 
 312. See HETH, supra note 234, at 172.  “A substitute for market insurance 
is to organize an implicit or explicit system of solidarity for the unlucky citi-
zens through an indemnity financed by the taxpayers.”  Gollier, supra note 14, 
at 16.   
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system would lighten the burden of insurance costs that states 
such as New York and California currently face, the U.S. Ac-
counting Office estimates that if the U.S. government solely 
provided terrorism coverage, the loss to federal tax reserves 
would be tremendous.313  TRIA’s private/public dichotomy solves 
this problem by allowing the private insurance industry to as-
sume responsibility for most claims, as many claims could po-
tentially fall within the Act’s established insurers’ deductible 
requirements.  Despite temporary intervention on the part of 
the U.S. government in the nation’s recent insurance crisis, 
concerns remain regarding the permanence the federal insur-
ance subsidies.314  If the insurance industry’s current govern-
ment deductible falls too low, another attack may still leave the 
U.S. vulnerable to the costs of another attack.315  Furthermore, if 
the insurance industry finds comfort in the U.S. government’s 
“reinsurance,” insurers may take a longer time to resume fully 
insuring terrorism risk through private reinsurers.  A future 
attack, therefore, may still leave the government paying for 
most of the risk assumed by insurers.316  However, the U.S. gov-
ernment faces the grimmer prospect of what might happen to 
properties that decline to participate in TRIA’s program.  The 
political reality is that if another terrorist attack occurs, the 
situation will require government assistance and compensa-
tion.317  U.S. government assistance in the aftermath of a tragic 
event, therefore, fails to make use of TRIA and the insurance 
industry’s expertise and goes against the very purpose of the 
establishment of the U.S. government’s Terrorist Insurance 
Program.318   
  
 313. See CBO STUDY, supra note 88, at 27–35. 
 314. See BROWN ET AL., supra note 255, at 8 (pointing out that “a continuing 
government role in the terrorism risk insurance market could hinder the de-
velopment of private capacity to cover terrorism risk”).  Cf. HILLMAN, supra 
note 55, at 16 (contemplating the benefits of having permanent government 
involvement in terrorism insurance).  
 315. See CBO STUDY, supra note 88, at 26–30 (suggesting massive economic 
problems to U.S. insurance industry even with a government program). 
 316. See HILLMAN, supra note 55, at 3; Orszag & Pechman, supra note 241, 
at 4 (noting that if the government does not convince the private sector that it 
will not provide any bailouts in the case of another attack, the nation may 
have to intervene). 
 317. See Gollier, supra note 14, at 16.   
 318. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, § 103. 
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The common reason why property owners do not purchase 
terrorism insurance is due to high premiums.  At this time, 
owners have no incentive aside from the protection of extra cov-
erage to purchase terrorism insurance.319  TRIA does not provide 
the purchasers of terrorism insurance any incentives.320  Mean-
while, insurers have the main incentive of reinsurance backing 
through the nation’s federal government.321  Consumers, how-
ever, primarily face external incentives from their lenders.322  
For example, many lenders now require terrorism insurance for 
large commercial buildings and new large-scale construction 
projects.323 The problem then remains, for example, in the case 
of properties that already have mortgages, as it is highly 
unlikely that lenders will aggressively file loan defaults for the 
failing owners to purchase terrorism insurance, since many 
have not done so already.324  
The Israeli system and the U.K. government’s insurance in-
tervention in Northern Ireland provide some insight as to how 
the U.S. government can make use of the American tax system 
  
 319. See Orszag & Pechman, supra note 241, at 5 (asserting that the Fed-
eral government could make the purchase of terrorism insurance coverage 
mandatory, which would in turn enhance the insurance industry’s ability to 
force purchasers into taking greater security measures).  See also Gollier, 
supra note 14, at 10 (noting that the enforcement of a policy in support of risk 
prevention alleviates the disparities that ex ante moral hazard situations 
create); Orszag & Pechman, supra note 241, at 2 (explaining the economic 
theory of “negative externality” in terms of national security relating to terror-
ism).  Terrorist attacks undermine a nation’s sovereignty in the same manner 
as an invasion and as a result the costs of such an attack “extend well beyond 
the immediate areas and people affected,” imposing costs on the entire nation.  
Id.  For this reason, private markets and individuals “undertake less invest-
ment in security than would be socially desirable” in order to reach satisfac-
tory profit levels.  See id.  Therefore, government intervention must bridge the 
security level discrepancy.  Id.              
 320. For example, the question of whether borrowers can impute their pur-
chase of terrorism insurance to their loan principal still remains unclear.  See 
Block & Steiner, supra note 276, at 5.  For cases that dealt with this issue 
before TRIA’s enactment, see Four Times Square Associates, L.L.C. v. Cigna 
Investments, Inc., No. 107745/02 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002, rev’d, 2003 N.Y. App. 
Div. Lexis 6170 (1st Dep.), and Philadelphia Plaza Phase II v. Bank of Amer-
ica National Trust and Savings Ass’n, 2002 WL 1472337 (Pa. CCP 2002).   
 321. See U.S. Office of Public Affairs, TRIA Announcement, supra note 245. 
 322. See Block & Steiner, supra note 276. 
 323. Id.  
 324. Id.   
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in order to encourage terrorism insurance coverage.   The U.S. 
probably would not benefit from a social security type system 
similar to that available in Israel because Israel’s constant 
property damage requires more intense government involve-
ment in the protection of property and citizenry.325  The U.S. can 
learn a lesson, however, from the Israeli and U.K. government 
insurance systems in order to implement its own incentives to 
help induce property owners into purchasing terrorism insur-
ance.326  In particular, the U.S. can create incentives for con-
sumers of terrorism insurance by incorporating some changes to 
current U.S. tax laws that would work parallel to TRIA. 
Offering tax incentives to property owners for terrorism cov-
erage would help induce property owners to obtain terrorism 
insurance coverage in addition to property and casualty insur-
ance.327  U.S. tax law currently allows for the deduction of busi-
ness and property losses for damaged property.328  As insurance 
  
 325. See Sommer, supra note 218, at 359. 
 326. However, insurance specialists note that even social insurance systems 
can face the same problems that trouble the private insurance industry, 
meaning that purely public “solidarity systems” may also face the problems of 
adverse selection, fraud, and moral hazard.  See Gollier, supra note 14, at 16.  
 327. Terrance Chorvat & Elizabeth Chorvat, Income Tax as Implicit Insur-
ance Against Losses From Terrorism, 36 IND. L. REV. 425, 426 (arguing that by 
“forcing the government to provide insurance for its failures, the tax system 
can overcome potential public choice problems….[as] without additional be-
havioral incentives, individuals will not behave in a socially optimal way with 
respect to protection from terrorist attacks”); Orszag & Pechman, supra note 
241, at 5.  See also LAKDAWALLA & ZANJANI, supra note 243, at 13 (explaining 
how governmental budget considerations can incorporate public protection 
and government insurance subsidies).  Cf. Heal & Kunreuther, supra note 
268, at 13 (suggesting the direct taxation of airline companies in order to en-
courage heightened baggage security); Martin F. Grace et al., The Demand for 
Homeowners Insurance with Bundled Catastrophe Coverage, (Paper prepared 
for the Wharton Project on Managing and Financing Extreme Risks, April 4, 
2001) (examining the role of government incentives on inducing consumers to 
purchase insurance coverage for natural perils), available at http://www.aria. 
org/rts/proceedings/2000/homeowners.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2004). 
 328. IRC § 162 (2000) (enumerating trade and business losses that fall un-
der the category of a legitimate loss for tax deduction purposes); IRC § 165 
(2000) (allowing for deduction of losses occurring within the taxable year).  An 
example can help illustrate how U.S. tax laws work with respect to the de-
ductibility of losses: 
[A]ssume A has a business and the total assets of the business are 
worth $100,000 at the beginning of the year, including a $10,000 
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premiums represent the expected value of loss,329 the U.S. tax 
system could provide the public with an incentive to purchase 
terrorism insurance by allowing for the deduction of such in-
surance premiums in the same manner that the U.S. Internal 
Revenue Code would calculate a loss, and such recoveries 
should be exempt from income.330 
Incorporating such a tax incentive in support of terrorism in-
surance will also require the U.S. government to incorporate 
such tax estimates into the nation’s overall budget, which will 
encourage decision-makers to incorporate the potential risks of 
terrorism and evaluate their resources in a manner that best 
works to prevent future terrorist attacks in the U.S.331  The Is-
raeli governmental insurance system requires the nation to in-
clude its insurance claims in the government budget, and this 
self awareness places the issue of national protection at the 
forefront of their political process.332  The U.S. can similarly take 
terrorism insurance into account in a manner that would simul-
taneously limit its financial exposure of having to pay the cost 
of another terrorist attack.             
2. The Public/Private Terrorism Insurance Dichotomy and  
All It Can Offer   
Even though a nation can arguably bear the burden of solely 
assuming the financial costs of insuring against terrorism, bear-
  
computer.  If the computer is destroyed and has to be replaced, A has 
suffered a $10,000 loss and the net value of assets of the business is 
$90,000.  Because there has been a net decrease to wealth, A’s tax-
able income is reduced by $10,000.  Hence, the amount of income tax 
A owes will be reduced by $10,000 multiplied by the tax rate. 
Chorvat & Chorvat, supra note 327, at 429 (exploring U.S. income tax rule 
incentives in certain basic situations). 
 329. Insurance policies should charge an insurance premium that is equal to 
the cost of the potential loss multiplied by the risk of loss.  Id. at 430. 
 330. Id.  Such a tax scheme is justified as no “net change in wealth” has 
occurred.  Id.  In other words, a person who receives an insurance payment 
that is equal to their loss does not earn anything additional.  Instead, insur-
ance payments simply reinstate the property owner at the same state as be-
fore the loss had occurred.  Therefore, tax deductibles should not apply in 
situations where insurance payments “over-compensate” an insured for their 
losses.  Id.  
 331. Id. at 443. 
 332. See generally Sommer, supra note 218. 
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ing the entire risk alone would prove to be highly inefficient.333  
If the U.S. government took on the role of insurance carriers, 
the responsibility would also include risk management and 
documentation, which have proven to be extremely time con-
suming and expensive in the wake of September 11.334  TRIA 
and Pool Re similarly sidestep this problem by establishing 
public/private insurance schemes that seem beneficial for a 
smoother implementation of terrorism coverage, private indus-
try re-development, and national security.335  Both insurance 
programs have many things in common, but they also have im-
portant differences that highlight areas where TRIA needs 
some improvement.336        
Both TRIA and Pool Re work to keep the insurance industry 
involved in the coverage of terrorist attacks.  The insurance in-
dustry’s assumption of the risks of others requires that the in-
dustry also provide incentives for risk management through a 
lowering of premiums.337  Although governments can establish 
reimbursement incentives, such programs do not prove entirely 
beneficial, as studies have shown that consumers do not take 
full advantage of such opportunities.338  The insurance indus-
try’s involvement in terrorism coverage, however, serves to 
force property owners seeking terrorism insurance to assume 
increased responsibility for ensuring safety and satisfying the 
  
 333. See HILLMAN, supra note 55, at 3 (explaining that the federal govern-
ment’s size and sovereign power provide it with the ability to provide insur-
ance in a way that the private sector could not).  
 334. See BROWN ET AL., supra note 255, at 7.  See also Terrorism Risk Insur-
ance Program; Initial Risk Insurance Program; Initial Claims Procedures, 68 
Fed. Reg. No. 230, 67101 (Dec. 1, 2003) (to be codified at 31 C.R.F. pt. 50) (ex-
plaining how the insurance the insurance industry is currently processing and 
administering claims).   
 335. See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, § 103; 
U.K. Treasury Announcement, supra note 165, at 8.  See also LAKDAWALLA & 
ZANJANI, supra note 243, at 13 (arguing that even with mechanisms of public 
protection in place, government insurance subsidies prove to be the optimal 
approach in increasing terrorism protection). 
 336. See Finding a TRIA Replacement, INS. DAY, Dec. 12, 2003, available at 
LEXIS, Nexis News & Bus. Library. 
 337. See THOMAS VON UNGERN-STERNBERG, STATE INTERVENTION ON THE 
MARKET FOR NATURAL DAMAGE INSURANCE IN EUROPE 16 (CESifo, Working 
Paper No. 1067, 2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?a 
bstract_id=464601 (last visited Jan. 12, 2004). 
 338. See Woo, supra note 20.  
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requirements of their lenders.339  TRIA and Pool Re keep the 
insurance industry intact, and in this way these programs allow 
for private intervention in terrorism risk mitigation.     
Furthermore, TRIA and Pool Re take advantage of the insur-
ance industry’s capability to process detailed documentation 
regarding specific properties’ insurance needs and potential re-
quirements.340  The risk management actions that the private 
sector offers entail any of the following: building design, struc-
ture evaluations, safety equipment, evacuation plans, exit 
strategies, and heightened security systems for trophy proper-
ties — insurers then underscore each action with a reduced 
principle.341  By maintaining private sector involvement, both 
programs allow insurers to keep checks on protection meas-
ures.342  The private sector’s involvement, therefore, helps en-
sure that adequate measures protect insured properties from 
terrorist calamity.343  TRIA and Pool Re’s implementation allow 
the insurance industry to set higher standards for the mitiga-
tion of potential damages caused by terrorism.    
  
 339. See Block & Steiner, supra note 276, at 5.      
 340. The insurance industry provides data on insured losses through reports 
known as “bordereau” to their reinsurers, and TRIA makes use of this practice 
by requiring insurance companies to maintain and create such records for the 
federal program, which in turn keeps this insurance industry practice intact 
for a later time when the government will cease to regulate terrorism insur-
ance.  See Department of Treasury, 68 Fed. Reg. No. 230, 67100, 67102–3 
(Feb. 28, 2003) (to be codified at 31 C.R.F. pt. 50). 
 341. See BROWN ET AL., supra note 255, at 6–7 (explaining that a “profit 
maximizing firm will invest in risk mitigation up to the point where the mar-
ginal costs of additional mitigation is equal to the marginal cost of insuring 
against that risk”).  Two categories of risk mitigation exist: (1) investments 
that help protect existing buildings from terrorist attack (such as enhanced 
security, strengthening structural supports, shatter proof windows, and im-
proved air vents, etc.); and (2) influence on new building construction, which 
includes development considerations such as building size, location, architec-
tural design, etc.  Id. 
 342. See Jason B. Lee, Restructuring Building Design Against Terrorism, 
RISK MGMT., Nov. 2002, available at http://rmmag.com/MGTemplate.cfm?Secti 
on=RMMagazine&NavMenuID=128&tem (last visited Nov. 11, 2002). 
 343. However, insurance companies’ incentives to mitigate terrorist risks 
may also influence developers to avoid constructing high profile buildings or 
projects.  See BROWN ET AL., supra note 255, at 7.  See also HILLMAN, supra 
note 55, at 15 (arguing that the insuring of any risk should also incorporate 
the private insurance industry).   
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TRIA undisputedly resembles the British Pool Re system, but 
it differs in many respects as Pool Re has had significant time 
to mature as a mutual reinsurance program and the U.K. as a 
nation has thirty years of experience in facing the issue of ter-
rorism.344  Pool Re has been covering the U.K.’s terrorism insur-
ance program for eleven years and has gained a substantial 
amount of monetary leverage and experience.345   Similar to the 
U.S., Pool Re’s fate as a government terrorism insurance system 
was questionable,346 but over the years the program has ex-
panded in a manner that allows it to adapt to current terrorism 
concerns.347  Accordingly, the U.S. can learn from Pool Re’s ex-
perience.  The U.S. can specifically take note of the U.K.’s Pool 
Re approach in expanding coverage, defining terrorism, estab-
lishing premium requirements, and allowing for the review of 
Pool Re’s decisions.  
Pool Re has proven successful in providing the nation’s terror-
ism reinsurance needs, and, for this reason, the program has 
expanded to cover terrorism-related perils that at one time were 
covered by neither the insurance industry nor the governmental 
program.348  Unlike the U.S., where many states require fire 
coverage, the U.K. initially did not include this type of damage 
in the terrorism insurance package offered by Pool Re.349  As the 
U.K. program has gained adequate capital in its reserves, Par-
liament decided that it would expand its Pool Re program to 
cover more terrorist-related risks after September 11.350  The 
U.K. now provides coverage for nuclear disaster, flood, etc.351  
The U.S. Terrorist Insurance Program falls short of such cover-
  
 344. See U.K. Cabinet Office, The United Kingdom and the Campaign 
Against International Terrorism, Sept. 9, 2002, at 12, at http://www.cabinet-
office.gov.uk/reports/sept11/coi-0809.pdf (last visited Jan. 5, 2004).   
 345. See TILLINGHAST UPDATE, supra note 168, at 3. 
 346. In Pool Re’s earlier stages, many insurance specialists expressed seri-
ous concerns and reservations regarding the government program.  See, e.g., 
Fleming, supra note 214.   
 347. See generally U.K. Treasury Announcement, supra note 165.  
 348. See generally TILLINGHAST UPDATE, supra note 168.  But see, e.g., An-
drew Bolger, Norwich Union Stresses Stance on War Cover, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 4, 
2003, at 4, available at 2003 WL 3429735 (noting that certain insurers in the 
U.K. are not willing to provide expansive terrorism insurance coverage). 
 349. See U.K. Treasury Announcement, supra note 165, at 5. 
 350. See id. at 1. 
 351. Id.  See also U.K. Cabinet Office, supra note 344, at 14. 
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age, allowing for claims arising from more conventional meth-
ods of terrorist attacks.352  As many commentators argue that 
terrorists probably will strike in a manner that has not been 
accounted for,353 traditional forms of terrorism may be chang-
ing.354  Accordingly, if the U.S. government allows for TRIA’s 
survival, the legislation will also have to include different varie-
ties of terrorist risk; otherwise its coverage may realistically 
prove minimal and it may spark litigation in the future.355 
The U.K. has also accounted for the changing nature of ter-
rorism as it has broadened the nation’s definition of terrorism 
overall.356  A terrorist attack in the U.K. includes domestic ter-
rorist groups of all types.357  The definition of a terrorist occur-
rence in the U.K. focuses on the effects of such an attack and 
the intent of such action on the nation.358  The U.S., on the other 
  
 352. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, § 103. 
 353. See, e.g., PANEL DISCUSSION, COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED 
SECURITIES ROUNDTABLE, IN REAL ESTATE FINANCE AND INVESTMENT JANUARY 
13, 2003 (Gale Group, Inc., 2003) (At this roundtable discussion, Joe Fran-
zetti, director of Salomon Smith Barney, emphasized that insurers are cur-
rently concerned about bio-terrorism, whereby terrorist could potentially tam-
per with a building’s HVAC system, which insurers believe could be accom-
plished more easily than more truck bombings, etc.); Ruth Gastel, Computer 
Security-Related Insurance Issues, INS. INFO. INST., Sept. 2003, available at 
LEXIS, Nexis News & Bus. Library (listing “cyber terrorism” as a new issue 
for first and third party insurance coverage).  See generally Thomas, supra 
note 43, at 413–17 (taking into account the different transaction costs in-
volved in insurance litigation of matters that fall in categories beyond the 
scope of “traditional terrorism,” i.e., bombings, political hostage-taking and 
airplane hijacking).  
 354. See id.  See also Orszag & Pechman, supra note 241, at 11 (explaining 
that enhanced security is essential for preventing terrorist uses of chemical 
and biological plants in their plans of mass destruction); U.K. Treasury An-
nouncement, supra note 165, at 2 (noting that terrorist can find ways to go 
beyond expected or typical scenarios).   
 355. See Lobel, supra note 260, at 39 (noting that nuclear, biological and 
chemical terrorism-caused losses are not presently included in property cover-
age and that if an attack is labeled as a terrorist act, then it remains unclear 
whether such exclusionary clauses will remain enforceable if terrorism is 
found to be the proximate cause of an attack).       
 356. See Reinsurance (Acts of Terrorism) Act, 1993, ch. 18, § 2(2) (Eng.).  
But see Terror Threat to Insurance Cover, BIRMINGHAM POST, Feb. 13, 2003, at 
22, available at 2003 WL 15602566. 
 357. Reinsurance (Acts of Terrorism) Act, 1993, ch. 18, § 2(2) (Eng.) 
 358. Id.  In fact, as a result of the U.K. government’s decision to expand the 
definition of terrorism, insurers have also made the similar changes in their 
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hand, restricts the definition of terrorism359 to attacks by mali-
cious foreign groups.360  This important distinction reflects how 
each nation also views the problem of terrorism.  The U.K.’s 
definition holds a terrorist act to be any act that goes against 
the Crown and the U.K.;361 however, the U.S. approach plainly 
focuses on terrorist organizations with roots from abroad with-
out realizing that the problem could just as well be a domestic 
one.362  Plainly, terrorist groups do not need to be cultivated 
abroad; terrorism may also be “homegrown.”363  The U.S.’ limited 
legislative definition of terrorism also poses practical problems 
for the insurance companies that provide terrorism coverage 
because TRIA’s definition limits the scope of coverage364 to ex-
clude circumstances where wider coverage is necessary.365     
  
own policies.  See, e.g., RSA Goes Solo on Terrorism, POST MAG., May 15, 2003, 
at 2, available at 2003 WL 8531267; RISK Report — Preparing for Combat, 
POST MAG., Feb. 13, 2003, at 36, available at 2003 WL 8530503. 
 359. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, § 
102(1)(A)(iv). 
 360. TRIA defines terrorism as an act “committed by an individual or indi-
viduals acting on behalf of any foreign person or foreign interest, as part of an 
effort to coerce the civilian population of the United States or to influence the 
policy or affect the conduct of the United States Government by coercion.”  Id. 
 361. Reinsurance (Acts of Terrorism) Act, 1993, ch. 18, § 2(2) (Eng.). 
 362. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, § 103.  See 
also TRIA Department Announces Proposed Regulation Implementing Claims 
Procedures Under the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, U.S. OFFICE OF PUBLIC 
AFFAIRS, Nov. 25, 2003, JS-1022 (quoting Treasury Assistant Secretary for 
Financial Institutions, Wayne Abernathy, who notes that TRIA protects the 
U.S. economy from “international terrorism”), at http://www.treas.gov/pres 
s/releases/js1022.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2004).   
 363. Suarez & Abrams, supra note 242 (reflecting on the Oklahoma City 
bombing example).  TRIA also gives deference to the U.S. Secretary of Treas-
ury to decide whether a U.S. citizen who sympathizes with a foreign interest 
falls under TRIA’s definition of a terrorist.  Id.  See also Epstein & Keyes, 
supra note 254, at 3.   
 364. For example, a terrorist act stemming from war could potentially be 
excluded from TRIA’s terrorism definition.  Michael Bradford, Terrorism Cov-
erage Poses Challenges, Opportunities; CPU Society 2003 Annual Meeting, 
BUS. INS., Nov. 17, 2003, at 24H (contemplating the exception that would arise 
had Congress officially declared a war on Iraq and a terrorist attack took 
place in support of Iraqi interests).  However, the U.S. Secretary of Treasury 
asserts that the war exclusion only applies to “acts of terrorism committed in 
connection with a formal, congressionally declared war” and not pursuant to 
military actions connected to the President’s role as the nation’s commander-
in-chief.  Letter from John W. Snow, U.S. Secretary of Treasury, to Michael G. 
Oxley, Chairman of Department of Treasury’s Committee of Financial Ser-
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In contrast to the U.K.’s expansive definition of terrorism and 
coverage exposure, Pool Re initially set specific premiums for all 
its participating insurance members,366 and continues to imple-
ment a “no adverse selection” principle.367  Pool Re no longer 
mandates specific premium prices for the insurance industry’s 
terrorism insurance packages; however, this change arrived 
long after Pool Re had established its own substantial financial 
reserves.368  The program also clearly demarcates the maximum 
monetary amount for which the insurance industry would be 
responsible with regard to terrorist events that occur in one 
year, which allows insurers to calculate their potential losses in 
advance.369  In addition, regardless of the U.K.’s current pre-
mium deregulation, Pool Re members and the U.K. Treasury 
Department are still in the process of negotiating the program’s 
financial issues, such as premium rates and membership par-
ticipation thresholds.370  Pool Re also allows for insurance com-
panies to adjust the premium rates that they charge if their 
clients take certain “prescribed risk management” steps.371  In 
  
vices (May 19, 2003), available at http://www.treas.gov/offices/domestic-
finance/financial-institution/terrorism-insurance/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2004).  
However, Mr. Snow also concludes this letter noting that the “letter is not 
meant to interpret or provide any opinion as to…privately negotiated limita-
tions and exclusions” found in private insurance contracts.  Id.  See also Ter-
rorism Risk Insurance Program, 68 Fed. Reg. No. 133, 41252 (July. 11, 2003) 
(to be codified at 31 C.R.F. pt. 50).     
 365. Staring, supra note 306, at para. 5 (noting that the requirement of 
having two separate policies will especially hold true in the case of marine 
insurance policies, which tend to require broader international insurance 
coverage).  See also Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–
297, § 106(a)(2)(A). 
 366. Note that Pool Re no longer regulates the insurance industry’s premi-
ums.  See U.K. Treasury Announcement, supra note 165, at 4.  However, the 
U.K. Treasury and Pool Re members will continue to discuss Pool Re’s finance 
issues, which undoubtedly include the adjustment of premiums.  Id. at 7.    
 367. Atkins, supra note 156; TILLINGHAST UPDATE, supra note 168, at 3.  
Participating insurers must specifically refer to Pool Re’s rate manual for 
premium prices.  Id.  Insurers then must cede this premium amount to Pool 
Re.  Id.   
 368. See Premiums Set to Increase After Changes at Pool Re Terrorism In-
surance Pricing is Set to Rise Again, LLOYD’S LIST INT’L, Jan. 2, 2003, available 
at 2003 WL 3047367; TILLINGHAST UPDATE, supra note 168, at 3.   
 369. See id.  U.K. Treasury Announcement, supra note 165, at 7.  
 370. U.K. Treasury Announcement, supra note 165, at 7. 
 371. TILLINGHAST UPDATE, supra note 168, at 3.  
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contrast, TRIA allows insurers to charge premiums based on 
their own ability to cover terrorist harm, and as a result, many 
insurers use this option as a legal loophole to circumvent pro-
viding terrorism insurance.372  TRIA technically requires all in-
surers to make terrorism insurance “available” to their clients, 
but the U.S. Treasury confirmed to many apprehensive insur-
ance companies that this requirement would not also stipulate 
that rates be reasonable.373  However, insurers still feel uncom-
fortable with TRIA’s lack of specificity in that the Act covers 
amounts that surpass the aggregate threshold amount, but the 
statute and program have not indicated how the program will 
approach the number of occurrences issue the nation faced with 
September 11.  For this reason, insurers’ ability to plan their 
own financial exposure is limited.374                              
  
 372. See Michael Prince, Insurers Frustrate Serio on Terror Law; State In-
surance Superintendent Blames Coverage Failure on Industry, CRAIN’S N.Y. 
BUS., Mar. 24, 2003, at 23 (reporting the details of an interview with Gregory 
Serio, New York State Department of Insurance’s superintendent, who noted 
that TRIA requires insurers to provide terrorism insurance coverage, but at 
the same time insurers have reacted by increasing their terror insurance 
premiums by 600% or by requesting approval for “broad-based terrorism ex-
clusions”).  Insurers, who manage to circumvent potential buyers of their ter-
rorism insurance, can then apply under TRIA for the reinstatement of their 
terrorism risk exclusions.  Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 
107–297, § 105(c).  See also Epstein & Keyes, supra note 254, at 3; BROWN ET 
AL., supra note 255, at 10 (explaining that underwriters have a limited actuar-
ial basis in calculating “probable maximum loss” for the pricing of terrorism 
insurance).  However, the U.S. Treasury has indicated that it plans on compil-
ing information on insurers’ insurance premium rates through corporate sur-
veys in order to make this information available to Congress, which signifies 
that the U.S. government is overseeing the insurance industry’s actions.  See 
Warshawsky, supra note 12, at 6, 8.   These surveys intend to capture TRIA’s 
effect on insurers’ deductibles on a yearly basis until 2005.  Id. at 11–21 (pro-
viding an overview of TRIA’s surveys).  The Treasury Department particularly 
seeks to establish the insurance industry’s change in capacity towards insur-
ing terrorism.  Id. at 18.  
 373. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, § 103; 
Masters, supra note 117, at 430–31.  See also Gollier, supra note 14, at 9, 11 
(noting that the prohibition of “discrimination or public information” can arti-
ficially increase the premium rate even for low risk agents, which actually 
serves to enhance the adverse selection problem, but at the same time a policy 
that allows for pricing discrimination balances policyholders’ incentive to in-
vest in “risk reducing activities”).  
 374. See Terrorism Risk Insurance Program, 68 Fed. Reg. No. 133, 41250, 
41252 (July. 11, 2003) (to be codified at 31 C.R.F. pt. 50) (noting that the 
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Nevertheless, the U.K.’s system can place restrictions on Pool 
Re insurance members, because it also limits insurers ability to 
insure with reinsurers who wish to participate in the govern-
ment-sponsored program.375  Pool Re does not require insurers to 
participate in the program,376 but its participating insurers can-
not seek private or additional reinsurance coverage.377  The U.K. 
program mandates that all of its participating members supply 
their deductibles solely to Pool Re.378  As a result, over the pro-
gram’s lifetime, these provisions have allowed for Pool Re to 
expand its own reserves, decreasing the U.K.’s chances of with-
drawing from the nation’s own monetary reserves in the event 
of another major terrorist attack on the British mainland.379  
The U.S. could potentially apply such restrictions on partici-
pation; however, such restrictive provisions interfere with the 
government’s intention of keeping the program temporary.380  
TRIA seeks to encourage reinsurers to cover terrorism insur-
ance and for this reason the government insurance program 
does not limit insurers’ capabilities to work with reinsurance 
companies.381  In fact, many insurers of terrorism risk in the 
  
Treasury Department cannot ascertain a time frame requirement that the 
Secretary of Treasury can follow in the event of multiple terrorists attacks due 
to the “inherent uncertainty” involved in such situations).     
 375. See Cost of Terrorist Attack Insurance Falls by Half, TIMES (LONDON), 
July 31, 2003, available at 2003 WL 62398122 (reporting that a number of 
insurers can presently provide customers with competitive rates at lower 
rates than Pool Re’s participants, making such insurers especially attractive 
to property owners with covering single “prestige” buildings). 
 376. Id.; Barnes, supra note 142.  
 377. See Fleming, supra note 214, at 8.  Pool Re’s participation restrictions 
seem to benefit national insurance companies over international ones.  Id.  
However, private terrorism insurance coverage outside of Pool Re has also 
developed.  See Lloyd’s Terrorism Bulletin No. 4, Oct. 24, 2001, at http://www. 
millerinsurance.co.uk/Downloads/Terrorism4.doc (last visited Jan. 18, 2004) 
[hereinafter Lloyd’s Terrorism Bulletin].  
 378. TILLINGHAST UPDATE, supra note 168, at 3.  However, private terrorism 
insurance coverage outside of Pool Re has also developed.  See Lloyd’s Terror-
ism Bulletin, supra note 377.  
 379. See TILLINGHAST UPDATE, supra note 168, at 3.   
 380. See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, § 101.  
See also BROWN ET AL., supra note 255, at 9 (noting the “persistent concern 
that long-term government dominance…will mean a loss of the efficiency and 
innovation fostered by competition within the private sector.”).        
 381. See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, § 
103(g)(1).   
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U.S. have obtained reinsurance coverage for their government 
deductible in the likelihood of another terrorist attack.382  Rein-
surers’ reemergence in the realm of U.S. terrorism insurance 
coverage is two-fold: first, reinsurers are slowly feeling more 
comfortable with providing insurance companies coverage for 
the risk of terrorism; second, TRIA provides the insurance in-
dustry with a clear cap on its potential losses, which is a sum 
that insurers can incorporate in their transactions.383  It re-
mains unclear, however, whether the reinsurance industry 
would continue to allow insurers to cede their terrorism risks 
without TRIA’s limitations on potential liability.  Nevertheless, 
Pool Re’s example exemplifies the fact that the U.S. can effec-
tively provide support for terrorism insurance coverage without 
forcing all insurers to participate.  The U.K.’s governmental 
reinsurance model also demonstrates that premium setting 
plays a huge role in gaining public clientele at least at such a 
program’s initial stages.                    
Since the formation of TRIA’s coverage guidelines and mana-
gerial procedures are still in process, it also remains to be seen 
whether any issues may arise due to the lack of judicial re-
view.384 Despite U.K. provisions allowing for judicial review of 
Pool Re’s determinations, the authoritative appeal tribunal 
originates within the agency itself, potentially undermining the 
objectivity of the ultimate rulings.  However, at least the U.K. 
allows for some sort of review.  Although no crisis has seem-
ingly emerged from the U.K.’s limited review possibility, TRIA’s 
lack of judicial review may prove to be problematic in the U.S. 
as the legislation forecloses any possibility of judicial review.385  
  
 382. See Tackling a Burning Issue, supra note 304, at 36.  
 383. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, § 103(e)(2).   
 384. Masters, supra note 117, at 431. 
 385. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, § 103(e)(5).  
Several commentators attempted to thwart TRIA’s intolerance for judicial 
review by arguing that the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 
554, requires the U.S. Treasury Department to allow for claim determination 
appeals, under Section 102(3) of the APA.  Terrorism Risk Insurance Pro-
gram, 68 Fed. Reg. No. 133, 41250 (July 11, 2003) (to be codified at 31 C.R.F. 
pt. 50).  However, the Treasury Department has countered such legal conten-
tions by asserting that the APA’s hearing requirement applies only where a 
statute requires a hearing on the record, adding that the Supreme Court also 
supports this interpretation, and since TRIA specifically forbids such hear-
ings, the Treasury Department concludes that the APA does not apply.  Id.   
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Such a restriction reduces the transaction costs tied to litiga-
tion, but it ultimately may also sacrifice fairness and insurers’ 
confidence in the government program.386  Despite TRIA’s rigid-
ity on judicial review,387 the U.S. Department of Treasury cur-
rently works closely with the NAIC in order to establish a pro-
gram geared to assisting the insurance industry’s needs.388        
V.   CONCLUSION  
The question of TRIA’s renewal ultimately lies in who should 
potentially bear the costs of a terrorist attack — taxpayers, af-
ter the fact, or consumers through a previously established in-
surance system.389  Undoubtedly, the insurance industry will 
argue for the program’s continuance, but the real concern 
should be the U.S. economy and the public’s main interest in 
the long run.  TRIA has assisted in lowering the costs of terror-
ism insurance coverage, but, in order to give the program its 
true force, the legislation needs further tailoring to meet the 
current circumstances that the nation faces.   
The U.S. must consider offering property owners incentives to 
purchase terrorism coverage and fine-tuning TRIA’s regulation 
of the insurance industry.  Through tax incentives, property 
owners will most likely have a greater compulsion to invest in 
additional coverage for terrorist-related harm.  In addition, the 
U.S. should make insurance company participation in the gov-
ernment’s terrorism insurance program discretional, as most 
inflated premium rates serve as deliberate means of evading 
terrorism coverage.  These high premiums then distort the per-
spective of consumers, deterring the purchase of such insurance 
coverage.  Incorporating these changes in the government’s ex-
  
See also U.S. Lines Inc. v. Federal Maritime Commission, 584 F.2d 519 (D.C. 
Cir. 1978) (citing U.S. v. Florida East Coast R. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 234–38 
(1973)).  
 386. See generally Thomas, supra note 43.  However, insurers do have the 
opportunity to request a general interpretation of the statute by written sub-
mission to TRIP or through an informal oral hearing.   Bragg, supra note 9, at 
11. 
 387. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–297, § 103(e)(5). 
 388. Id. § 101.  See also Terrorism Risk Insurance Program; Initial Risk 
Insurance Program; Initial Claims Procedures, 68 Fed. Reg. No. 230, 67100 
(Dec. 1, 2003) (to be codified at 31 C.R.F. pt. 50).   
 389. See Gollier, supra note 14, at 17 (explaining that super-terrorism cre-
ates an “undiversifiable risk….that must be allocated to…consumers”).   
File: IreneMacro.doc Created on: 2/14/2004 4:41 PM Last Printed: 3/29/2004 3:15 PM 
2004] TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE ACT OF 2002 895 
isting program will help ignite the demand for terrorism insur-
ance cover and may also simultaneously accelerate the insur-
ance and reinsurance industries’ capacity and desire to insure 
terrorism on their own.  Stronger market forces will help fur-
ther decrease terrorism insurance premiums, and the larger 
consumer base will bring forth larger profits. 
As the terrorism insurance market gains its own capacity,390 
the U.S. government should also strongly consider expanding 
TRIA’s scope and coverage.  Since terrorism tactics and tech-
niques evolve with time, insurance coverage should also develop 
accordingly.  TRIA now offers the reinsurance backing neces-
sary for insurers to cover conventional means of terrorism, but 
it stops at conventional methods taken by foreign groups.  In-
stead, U.S. terrorism insurance coverage should expand in or-
der to be prepared for the worst.  Furthermore, TRIA’s foreign 
based terrorist agendas shifts the focus to problems abroad; 
however, such problems can develop from within the nation as 
well.  Therefore, TRIA has initiated the process of preparing the 
insurance industry to insure the risk of terrorism, but the 
groundwork for complete terrorism coverage is far from being 
complete.               
Although TRIA’s scheduled sunset is approaching, the risk of 
terrorism remains.391  This lingering risk continues to chill the 
nation’s insurance industry from fully embracing terrorism cov-
erage.392  The protection of a nation’s citizenry requires both na-
tional security and financial planning.393   
  
 390. Schoen, supra note 247 (quoting P.J. Crowley, vice president of the 
Insurance Information Institute). 
 391. “Simple calculations suggest that, despite international counter-
terrorist action, the risk is currently substantial, as indeed it was before Sep-
tember 11, 2001.”  Woo, supra note 20, at 17.      
 392. But see BROWN ET AL., supra note 255, at 15 (arguing that one of the 
“key features” of the U.S. terrorism risk insurance program is its “defined exit 
strategy”). 
 393. In addition to establishing the right insurance plan for the nation, the 
U.S. government also must simultaneously focus on the nation’s defensive 
mechanisms in order to prevent a terrorist attack from occurring again in the 
U.S.  This Note has not emphasized national security mechanisms only be-
cause this issue is not within its scope.  The issue of U.S. “Homeland Security” 
legislation and government security programs require their own legal analy-
sis.  However, a nation’s security mechanisms are invaluable to the preven-
tion of terrorism.  Any mitigation of terrorist risk would also have a positive 
counter-effect on the nation’s insurance industry’s ability to insure property.   
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TRIA represents a nation moving forward, overcoming immense 
suffering and loss.  Hopefully, the U.S. will never have to face 
another terrorist attack, but at least the U.S. has taken one im-
portant step, as other nations have done in the past, in prepara-
tion.            
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